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1 Introduction
The internal structure of a city is the outcome of the interplay between forces toward agglom-
eration and dispersion. The very high density of activities and population in cities induces
various congestion eﬀects, or dispersion forces, arising from higher land rents and longer
commutes. At the same time, despite the disincentives, there are agglomeration forces that
drive businesses or people to form clusters. In particular, agglomeration economies for busi-
nesses may arise due to nonmarket interactions, or knowledge spillovers, that enhance a ﬁrm’s
productivity when its employees can communicate closely with other workers in a city.1
In this paper, we address the emergence of polycentric city structures that arise from trade-
oﬀs between agglomeration economies and congestion eﬀects. Toward this aim, we build on
the seminal framework of Fujita and Ogawa (1982) (FO) to facilitate formal analyses. The FO
framework incorporates two canonical agent types: ﬁrms and households. Firms are subject to
agglomeration economies in the form of positive technological externalities, whereas house-
holds have to commute to their workplaces. Both agents compete for land. In this framework,
ﬁrms beneﬁt from proximity to other ﬁrms. If they agglomerate to form business districts,
however, they must pay higher rents and also compensate their workers for longer commutes
with higher wages. A spatial distribution of ﬁrms and households in equilibrium is deter-
mined by balancing these opposing forces. In urban economics, the framework is known as
a canonical model that can describe the formation of polycentric urban spatial structures in
equilibrium.2
Typical for models with positive externalities, a multiplicity of equilibria is inherent in
the FO framework. Equilibrium reﬁnement is crucial for drawing robust implications, since
some equilibria may be unattainable under any dynamics. Toward this goal, we employ the
theory of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Sandholm, 2001). We show that the FO
model is an instance of large-population (non-atomic) potential games; the model is reduced
to a maximization problem of a scalar-valued function (a potential function) that encapsulates
its incentive structure. In particular, the potential function is shown to capture the trade-oﬀ
between the agglomeration and dispersion forces in the model.
In potential games, sensible approaches are available for the characterization and reﬁne-
ment of equilibria. First, the set of Nash equilibria of a potential game coincides with that of
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) points of the maximization of the associated potential function.
Second, the local maximizers of the potential function is known to be locally stable under var-
ious standard dynamics, including the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), the
Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950; Nash, 1951), the Smith
dynamic (Smith, 1984), and Riemannian game dynamics (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm, 2018).3
See Sandholm (2001) as well as Sandholm (2010), Section 8.2. Third, the set of the global po-
tential maximizers are known to be globally stable under various premises. Building on Blume
(1993, 1997), Sandholm (2010) (Chapter 12) showed that the set of global potential maximiz-
1Agglomeration economies can be categorized into sharing, matching, and learning (Duranton and Puga, 2004).
2See surveys by, e.g., Anas et al. (1998) or Duranton and Puga (2015).
3As shown in their paper, Riemannian game dynamics encompass the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker,
1978) and the projection dynamic (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993) as their special cases.
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ers in a non-atomic potential game is stochastically stable.4 Also, Oyama (2009a,b) considered
equilibrium selection in a dynamic setting where the static payoﬀ is given by a “new economic
geography” model; it is shown that a perfect foresight dynamic selects the global potential
maximizer if the instantaneous payoﬀ admits a potential function. Thus, the properties of
local and global potential maximizer(s) are expected to reveal the essence of a potential game.
Given this background, we employ local and global maximizations of the potential func-
tion as equilibrium reﬁnement criteria. To concretely illustrate the utility of the potential
game approach in the context of the FO framework, we study the properties of spatial equi-
libria in two stylized geographies, namely, a two-location city and a circular city. We ﬁnd
that the formation of business centers can be a global potential maximizer but only when the
commuting costs of households are suﬃciently low. It is also shown that the number of busi-
ness centers monotonically decreases, while their size increases, when either the commuting
costs of households goes lower monotonically or the level of agglomeration externalities be-
tween ﬁrms diminishes monotonically. These results are consistent with intuition and with
conjectural predictions in the prior literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this study to the literature. Section 3
introduces a model of urban spatial conﬁgurations and shows that a potential maximization
problem characterizes equilibria of the model. Section 4 shows that the model can be decom-
posed and then reduced to an equivalent potential game in which only ﬁrms are the agents.
Sections 5 and 6 are example sections that study Fujita and Ogawa (1982)’s speciﬁcation using
the potential game method. Section 5 studies the simplest geography in which a city is divided
into two cells. Section 6 considers the circular geography to demonstrate that the formation of
multiple business centers can be a global potential maximizer. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
As highlighted in Section 1, this paper adopts a seminal framework proposed by Masahisa Fu-
jita and Hideaki Ogawa in two papers, Ogawa and Fujita (1980) and Fujita and Ogawa (1982).
They initiated the study of urban spatial equilibrium models with multiple types of agents
and economics of agglomeration.5 This framework has since been extended in many direc-
tions, including two-dimensional space (Ogawa and Fujita, 1989), a monopolistic competition
framework (Fujita, 1988), multi-unit ﬁrms (Ota and Fujita, 1993), and general equilibrium
frameworks (Lucas, 2001; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Berliant et al., 2002; Mossay et al.,
2017; Malykhin and Ushchev, 2018). Most notably, the latest generation of quantitative spatial
economic models (e.g., Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2019), implicitly or explicitly inher-
its many elements from these theories (see the survey by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
Due to the lack of eﬀective analytical methods, however, no previous study has addressed sta-
bility of equilibria in the FO framework when there are multiple equilibria. This paper is the
ﬁrst to theoretically investgate this issue.
4For surveys of stochastic stability concepts in game theory, see Sandholm (2010) (Chapters 11 and 12) as well
as Wallace and Young (2015).
5Study of socially optimal urban spatial structure under similar assumptions was explored by other researchers,
such as Imai (1982).
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Section 6 employs circular geography. Circular geography is one of the canonical setups
for theoretical investigations, since the setup abstracts away various eﬀects of geographical
asymmetries.6 Related to this paper, Mossay and Picard (2011) and Blanchet et al. (2016)
considered a spatial equilibrium model with a single type of mobile agents (Beckmann (1976)’s
model) over a circle. This paper, in contrast, has two types of mobile agents. Mossay and Picard
(2011) showed that the formation of equidistant, disjointed cities over the circumference is the
only possible equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, the equilibria are Pareto-ranked according
to the number of cities. In particular, the formation of a single city is the social optimum in
their framework. In our context, the multiple-city equilibrium can be interpreted as the for-
mation of multiple business centers in a city. In our setup, however, such symmetric spatial
conﬁgurations cannot be Pareto-ranked according to the number of business centers (see Sec-
tions 6.2 and 6.3). Pareto ranking depends on parameters. The contrast is natural since our
model considers two types of mobile agents.
To avoid technical complications, we consider a discrete-space model, where a city is di-
vided into a ﬁnite number of cells. A standard approach in the urban economics, however,
is to suppose a continuous space. Fujita and Ogawa (1982) considered a continuous real line
as the underlying geography. Such models are related to non-atomic games with continuous
strategy sets and a continuum of agents. A general theory of potential games for such class of
games, along with associated dynamics, was recently proposed by Cheung and Lahkar (2018).
Blanchet et al. (2016) characterized the spatial equilibria of a general class of continuous-
space urban models with a single type of agent as a variational problem. Bragard and Mossay
(2016) studied a relocation dynamics in the continuous-space framework of Mossay and Pi-
card (2011). Akamatsu et al. (2017) formulated a discrete-space version of Beckmann (1976)’s
model as a potential game and elucidated its properties. Uniﬁcation of this line of researches
can lead to a fruitful ﬁeld of applications of the potential game method.
3 A model for urban spatial structure
Building on the FO framework, this section formulates a discrete-space urban model. The
model generalizes the original FO model in that a location’s production level (introduced im-
mediately below) can take arbitral form as long as it satisﬁes certain assumptions.
Consider a city comprised of a set of discrete cells I ≡ {1, 2, . . . , I} (I ≥ 2). Each cell i ∈ I
is endowed with ai > 0 units of a ﬁxed supply of land. For normalization, we let ∑i∈I ai = 1.
There are two continuums of agents: ﬁrms and households. Since the model focuses mainly
on the spatial distribution of ﬁrms, households’ incentives are simpliﬁed (see Section 3.2).
3.1 Firms
There is a continuum of business ﬁrms. The set of strategies for ﬁrms is I . Each ﬁrm chooses
a cell i ∈ I to locate in. The total mass of ﬁrms is a ﬁxed constant M. Let mi ≥ 0 be the
6For instance, Papageorgiou and Smith (1983); Krugman (1993); Mossay and Picard (2011); Akamatsu et al.
(2012); Ikeda et al. (2012); Blanchet et al. (2016); Osawa et al. (2017); Ikeda et al. (2019).
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mass of ﬁrms in i ∈ I , and let m ≡ (mi)i∈I denote the spatial distribution, i.e., the strategy
distribution of ﬁrms.
Every ﬁrm produces a single unit of goods exported to the outside world with a ﬁxed price
(which is normalized to unity) prevailing there. Each ﬁrm requires one unit of land and φ > 0
units of labor to operate. The proﬁt of a ﬁrm choosing cell i is given by
pii = Ai(m)− φwi − ri, (3.1)
where Ai : RI+ → R+ is the level of production in cell i, R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} is the
set of nonnegative real numbers, wi ≥ 0 and ri ≥ 0 are, respectively, wages and land rents
prevailing in cell i, which are endogenously determined in the perfectly competitive labor and
land markets. We let w ≡ (wi)i∈I and r ≡ (ri)i∈I .
The set of all possible spatial conﬁgurations of ﬁrms is given by the following:
M≡
{
m ∈ RI+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈I mi = M, 0 ≤ mi ≤ ai ∀i ∈ I
}
, (3.2)
because each ﬁrm uses a single unit of land in production.
External economies in production, or technological externalities, arise from nonmarket
interactions. Firms are supposed to produce more goods when they are close to other ﬁrms.
We impose the following assumption on A(m) = (Ai(m))i∈I .
Assumption 1. The function A : RI+ → RI+ is C1 and
(i) ∇A(m) =
[
∂Ai(m)
∂mj
]
is positive deﬁnite with respect to TM≡ {ϵ = (ϵi) ∈ RI | ∑i∈I ϵi = 0}
for allm ∈ M. That is, ϵ⊤∇A(m)ϵ > 0 for all nonzero ϵ ∈ TM for allm ∈ M.
(ii) ∇A(m) is symmetric for allm ∈ RI+.
Assumption 1 (i) is a condition under which the production level A(m) features positive
externalities. Consider a deviation in the spatial distribution of ﬁrms such thatm′ = m+ ϵ ∈
M with an inﬁnitesimal ϵ ∈ TM. Then, Assumption 1 (i) implies that
∑
ϵi≥0
|ϵi|
(
Ai(m′)− Ai(m)
)− ∑
ϵi<0
|ϵi|
(
Ai(m′)− Ai(m)
)
= ϵ⊤∇A(m)ϵ > 0. (3.3)
The ﬁrst (second) term on the left hand side represents the aggregate gain in the level of
externalities in the cells with more (less) ﬁrms induced by the deviation. Thus, Assumption 1
(i) implies that the former always dominates the latter, meaning a self-reinforcing externality.
Suppose that a hypothetical ﬁrm leaves a cell and joins another. Then, improvements in the
level of positive externalities in the cell to which the ﬁrm switches dominate those found in
one left.
Assumption 1 (ii) is externality symmetry (Sandholm, 2001), under which the marginal ef-
fect of adding a ﬁrm to cell i on Aj(m) is the same as the marginal eﬀect of adding a ﬁrm to
cell j on Ai(m). As we will see, Assumption 1 (ii) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
A(m) to be integrable.
5
Example 1. Positive externalities within each cell is expressed by Ai(m) = mαi with α > 0. ♦
Example 2. Fujita and Ogawa (1982) assumed that Ai(m) = ∑j∈I exp
(−τℓij)mj where τ > 0
and ℓij ≥ 0 is the distance between cells i and j with ℓij = ℓji. ♦
3.2 Households
Households are another continuum of actors. The set of strategies for households is I × I .
Each household chooses in which cell i ∈ I to reside and to which cell j ∈ I to commute. The
mass of households that commute from cell i to cell j is denoted by nij ≥ 0. The commuting
pattern as a whole (i.e., the strategy distribution of households) is denoted by n ≡ (nij)ij∈I×I .
There also is an outside option. Households can freely migrate from or toward the outside
world, where their reservation utility is normalized to be 0. The equilibrium mass of house-
holds in the city is therefore endogenously determined.7
Each household is endowed with a single unit of labor, supplied to ﬁrms, and compensated
by a wage. Each household consumes one unit of land inelastically for residential purposes.
The indirect utility of a household that chooses cell i for its residential location and cell j as its
job location is supposed to be
vij = wj − tij − ri, (3.4)
where the constant tij ≥ 0 is the commuting cost from i to j in the monetary unit.
3.3 Spatial equilibrium
In equilibrium, every ﬁrm should maximize its own proﬁt by choosing its location. Every
household should maximize its own utility. These conditions are expressed as follows:
(utility maximization) 0 ≤ nij ⊥ v∗ − vij ≥ 0 ∀ij ∈ I × I , (3.5)
(proﬁt maximization) 0 ≤ mi ⊥ pi∗ − pii ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I , (3.6)
where the notation 0 ≤ q ⊥ p ≥ 0 represents the complementarity condition q ≥ 0, p ≥ 0, and
qp = 0. The scalars v∗ = 0 and pi∗ ≥ 0 are, respectively, the reservation utility of households
and an equilibrium proﬁt level of ﬁrms.
Land and labor markets are perfectly competitive and markets clear when the following
conditions are met, thereby w and r are endogenously determined:
(land market clearing) 0 ≤ ai −mi −∑
j∈I
nij ⊥ ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I , (3.7)
(labor market clearing) 0 ≤ ∑
i∈I
nij − φmj ⊥ wj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ I . (3.8)
Following conventions in urban economic theory, we assume that land is owned by absentee
landlords who spend their rental revenues outside the city. We normalize the opportunity cost
of land to 0, so thatmini∈I ri = 0.
7In urban economics, this type of models is called open-city models. See Fujita (1989).
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Lastly, since the total mass of ﬁrms in the city is ﬁxed, we require
(conservation) ∑
i∈I
mi = M. (3.9)
To summarize, an equilibrium in the model is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A spatial equilibrium is a pair of strategy distributions of households and ﬁrms
(n,m) with its associated market prices and equilibrium proﬁts level of ﬁrms (r,w,pi∗) that
satisfy the conditions (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9).
Remark 1. Let N be the equilibrium mass of households. Then, N = φM because every
household in the city should supply its labor to some ﬁrm, and every ﬁrm requires φ units of
labor to operate. Note also that, from (3.7),M+N = (1+φ)M ≤ ∑i∈I ai = 1, orM ≤ 11+φ < 1,
must hold true for a spatial equilibrium to exsit. The restriction on M ensures that the total
land endowments meet the total land demand in equilibrium. ♦
3.4 Potential maximization formulation
Spatial equilibria are characterized by a maximization problem of a scalar-valued function
over the set of all feasible strategy distributions (m,n) of ﬁrms and households. In this sense,
the model can be interpreted as a non-atomic potential game.8
Let h : RI
2
+ → R denote total commuting costs of households:
h(n) = ∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
tijnij. (3.10)
Also, note that Assumption 1 (ii) is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a function
f : RI+ → R such that ∇ f (m) =
[
∂ f (m)
∂mi
]
= A(m) for allm ∈ RI+. In the integral form,
f (m) =
∮
A(ω) · dω, (3.11)
where the path integral is taken over any piecewise smooth path from 0 tom.
In addition, we note that any pair of strategy distributions (m,n) should satisfy
(land supply) mi +∑
j∈I
nij ≤ ai ∀i ∈ I , (3.12)
(labor supply) ∑
i∈I
nij ≥ φmj ∀j ∈ I , (3.13)
as well as the conservation condition (3.9). We have the following result.9
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 (ii). Then, any spatial equilibrium of the model is a KKT
point of the following optimization problem:
max
(m,n)≥0
f (m)− h(n) s.t. (3.12), (3.13), and (3.9) (P0)
8See Appendix B for a discussion.
9All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
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where r,w, and pi∗ are determined as the Lagrange multipliers for the land supply constraint (3.12),
the labor supply constraint (3.13), and the conservation constraint (3.9), respectively.
The objective function of (P0) encapsulates the structure of the model. The ﬁrst term f (m)
is a measure of ﬁrms’ beneﬁt from agglomeration. The second term h(n) is the total commut-
ing cost that is spent in the city by the commuting pattern n. Thus, (P0) is a problem that
pertains to maximizing the beneﬁt of ﬁrms’ agglomeration while also reducing the commut-
ing costs of households. The former corresponds to the agglomeration force, whereas the latter
corresponds to the dispersion force (see Section 4.4).
4 Reduction to ﬁrms’ game
To simplify the analysis of the properties of spatial equilibria, we decompose the model into a
two-stage game by postulating that the adjustment of households’ decision is faster than that
of ﬁrms. In other words, we interpret the model as a Stackelberg leader–follower game, where
ﬁrms lead and households follow, assuming that households play only passive and static roles
in the game.10 Since an individual ﬁrm or household is inﬁnitesimally small, such decompo-
sition does not aﬀect the properties of equilibria (see Remark 2).11
In the lower-stage game, the strategy distribution (spatial distribution) of ﬁrmsm ∈ M is
ﬁxed, and only households choose their strategies ij ∈ I × I (residential location and work-
place). In the upper-stage game, ﬁrms choose locations i ∈ I to maximize their proﬁt in
response to the households’ aggregate behavior, as well as market prices, in the lower stage.
4.1 Lower-stage game
Let N (m) denote the closed and convex set of all feasible commuting patterns, or strategy
distributions of households, under a ﬁxedm ∈ M:
N (m) ≡
{
n ∈ RI2+
∣∣∣ s.t. (3.12) and (3.13)} . (4.1)
Then, equilibria in the lower-stage game are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. Fix m ∈ M. An equilibrium in the lower-stage game is a commuting pattern
n ∈ N (m) and its associated market prices (r,w) that satisfy conditions (3.5), (3.7), and (3.8).
We denote an equilibrium value of r in the lower-stage game by rˇ = (rˇi). Note that rˇ do
not necessarily coincide with the equilibrium land rent in the upper-stage game because ﬁrms’
strategies (locations) are ﬁxed in the lower stage. Since ﬁrms have no incentive to raise wage
w in the upper stage, wage should coincide with the upper-stage value.
Solving a lower-stage game becomes an optimization problem.
10This type of decomposition is a standard approach in spatial economics. For example, economic geography
models á la Krugman (1991) consider the so-called short-run equilibrium, where market prices are determined
under the condition that the spatial distribution of mobile actors,m, is ﬁxed. It deﬁnes the payoﬀ of mobile agents
as a function ofm. Then, the so-called long-run equilibrium considers the spatial distribution of mobile agents in
equilibrium, according to the payoﬀ function.
11From an optimization theory perspective, this interpretation corresponds to a Benders’ Decomposition (Benders,
1962; Geoﬀrion, 1972) of problem (P0). Other possible decompositions of (P0) are discussed in Appendix C.
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Proposition 2. Any lower-stage equilibrium under a ﬁxedm ∈ M has the following properties:
(a) The aggregate commuting pattern n is a KKT point for the following problem:
min
n∈N (m)
h(n). (S)
(b) The corresponding market prices (rˇ,w) are a KKT point for the following problem:
max
(rˇ,w)≥0
φ∑
i∈I
wimi −∑
i∈I
rˇi (ai −mi) s.t. 0 ≥ wj − tij − rˇi ∀i, j ∈ I , (D)
where we normalize rˇ and w by letting mini∈I{rˇi} = 0.
The problem (S) minimizes total commuting costs across the city while satisfying land and
labor market constraints. On the other hand, (D) is the dual problem for (S). The ﬁrst term
of its objective is total wages received by households, and the second term is total land rent
paid. It determines the highest bid rˇ for land and the lowest possible wage w to compensate
for commuting costs and land rents. Also note that a bounded solution exists for both (S) and
(D), because (3.12), (3.13), and the nonnegativity constraint of n deﬁne a nonempty, closed,
and convex set.
4.2 Upper-stage game
Knowing households’ responses, ﬁrms choose their location i ∈ I . The “lower-stage” proﬁt
pˇi(m) = (pˇii(m))i∈I of ﬁrms is deﬁned as
pˇii(m) = Ai(m)− ci(m), (4.2)
where ci(m) is the ﬁrms’ minimum possible cost required to operate in cell i ∈ I . With
lower-stage market prices (w(m), rˇ(m)) (i.e., a solution for (D)), ci(m) is given by
ci(m) ≡ φwi(m) + rˇi(m). (4.3)
In the upper stage, ﬁrms may have to pay higher land rents ri > rˇi(m) to win the compe-
tition for land. Let rˆi ≡ ri − rˇi(m) ≥ 0. With pˇi(m) and rˆi, the proﬁt-maximization condition
for ﬁrms in (3.6) can be rewritten as follows:12
0 ≤ mi ⊥ pi∗ − (pˇii(m)− rˆi) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I . (4.4)
Regarding rˆ = (rˆi), the following conditions should be met:
0 ≤ ai −mi ⊥ rˆi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I . (4.5)
That is, if households cannot aﬀord to reside in cell i (i.e., if ri = rˇi + rˆi > rˇi), the cell is
completely occupied by ﬁrms. Conversely, if mi < ai and ∑j∈I nij > 0, land rents paid by ﬁrms
12Firms’ proﬁt (3.1) can be rewritten as pii = Ai − φwi − ri = Ai − φwi − (rˇi + rˆi) = Ai − ci − rˆi = pˇii − rˆi.
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and households must be the same, and rˆi = 0.
Equilibrium conditions for the upper-stage game can be summarized as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. An equilibrium in the upper-stage game is a strategy distribution of ﬁrmsm ∈
M with its associated market prices and equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms (rˆ,pi∗) that satisfy (4.4),
(4.5), and (3.9).
4.3 Potential maximization formulation for the upper-stage game
The upper-stage game reduces to an optimization problem. First, observe that the lower-stage
game induces a function ofm. Let hˇ : M→ R denote the optimal value of (S) as a function of
m. With a solution n∗(m) to (S), we let13
hˇ(m) = h(n∗(m)). (4.6)
In the following, we assume an extension hˇ : RI+ → R+ with an abuse of notation.14
We observe that hˇ(m) is the integral of the ﬁrms’ cost function c(m) = (ci(m))i∈I . To
see this, note that hˇ(m) is also the optimal value of (D) because of the strong duality of linear
programming. Thus, the envelope theorem regarding dual representation (D) implies that
∂hˇ(m)
∂mi
= φwi(m) + rˇi(m) = ci(m) (4.7)
for almost allm ∈ M.15
Deﬁne a function g : RI+ → R by g(m) ≡ f (m) − hˇ(m). Then, g turns out to be the
potential function for pˇi(m). Recalling that ∇ f (m) = A(m), we have
∂g(m)
∂mi
=
∂ f (m)
∂mi
− ∂hˇ(m)
∂mi
= Ai(m)− ci(m) = pˇii(m) (4.8)
for almost allm ∈ M. Thus, g(m) is a potential function for pˇi(m).
To summarize, under Assumption 1 (ii), the upper-stage game can be interpreted as a non-
atomic potential game with strategy set I , state spaceM, payoﬀ function pˇi : M→ RI , and a
potential function g : RI+ → R. In particular, the following result holds true.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 (ii). Then, any equilibrium spatial distribution m in the
upper-stage game is a KKT point for the following maximization problem:
max
m∈M
g(m) = f (m)− hˇ(m). (P)
13Since (S) is a linear programming problem, in general, the equilibrium commuting pattern n∗(m) may not
be uniquely determined. However, because the minimized commuting cost h(n∗(m)) is uniquely given for any
m ∈ M, it can be regarded as a function ofm.
14Such an extension is simple because hˇ is a piecewise aﬃne function in m. We extend each aﬃne function
deﬁned on a nonempty subset ofM to that deﬁned on RI+ and then take the point-wise maximum.
15Note that, in the standard sense, hˇ can be nondiﬀerentiable in a measure-zero subset ofM. See Remark B.5 in
Appendix B.
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Remark 2. Any equilibrium in the upper-stage game is a spatial equilibrium of the overall
model (Section 3), and vice versa. This follows from a known fact that (P) is equivalent to (P0)
under the condition that (S) admits solution for all m ∈ M, (Tuy, 1987, Proposition 2.1). In
particular, it implies that a pair of strategy distributions (m,n) locally (globally) maximizes
f (m)− h(n) if and only ifm locally (globally) maximizes g(m) = f (m)− hˇ(m). ♦
4.4 General properties
The shape of the potential function g provides general insights into the properties of equilibria.
In g, the two terms f and hˇ encapsulate the two basic forces in the model laid out in Section 3,
one toward ﬁrms’ dispersion, and the other toward ﬁrms’ agglomeration. This is reﬂected in
the convexity properties of f and hˇ.
We observe that hˇ is convex.16
Observation 1. hˇ : RI+ → R is piecewise aﬃne and convex onM. ♦
This reﬂects that the second term corresponds to the dispersion forces for ﬁrms. Recall
that hˇ represents households’ minimized commuting costs (the primal representation (S)) and,
equivalently, the ﬁrms’ minimum possible operating costs (the dual representation (D)) at
m ∈ M. Observation 1 means that concentration of ﬁrms in a smaller number of cells induces
higher total commuting costs for households while also implying that ﬁrms’ higher operational
costs compensate for these greater commuting costs with higher wages. Also, hˇ(m) = 0 for
all m such that (1 + φ)mi ≤ ai for all i ∈ I . That is, if all households can reside at their
workplaces when ﬁrms are dispersed throughout a city, then no commuting costs are spent.
In sum, the second term of the potential function g is larger when ﬁrms are dispersed.
On the other hand, f is strictly convex.17
Observation 2. Under Assumption 1 (i), f : RI+ → R is strictly convex onM. ♦
The convexity of f reﬂects that it corresponds to the agglomeration force for ﬁrms. Firms’
production levels are higher when they are located close to other ﬁrms. Representing the
agglomerative eﬀects, f is larger near the corners of M, or when ﬁrms are agglomerated in a
smaller number of cells.
Whether ﬁrms agglomerate or disperse is determined by the balance of two opposing forces
expressed by the two terms f and −hˇ. In particular, the potential function g is generally
neither concave nor convex but piecewise strictly convex, indicating that there may be numerous
possible equilibria.
Remark 3 (Eﬃciency). A welfare-maximization problem for the model may be formulated as
follows:
max
m∈M
g˜(m) ≡ f˜ (m)− hˇ(m), (W)
16Note that hˇ(m) is a solution for (D) and therefore a point-wise maximum of aﬃne functions ofm.
17Assumption 1 (i) is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the strict convexity of f on the hyperplanes of
the formM(α) ≡ {m ∈ RI | ∑i∈I mi = α} (α ∈ R), implying the assertion sinceM = M(M).
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where f˜ (m) ≡ ∑i∈I Ai(m)mi, and g˜ represents ﬁrms’ aggregate proﬁts. In equilibrium, ﬁrms’
agglomeration is inadequate when compared with a social optimum. To demonstrate this, we
build on Sandholm (2001), Section 5. Suppose that A is homogeneous of degree k > 0, that is,
A(αm) = αkA(m) for all α ∈ R andm ̸= 0. Then, we see that
f (m) =
1
k+ 1
f˜ (m). (4.9)
This relationship implies that (P) assigns a smaller weight to f˜ (m) than (W) does. Because
f˜ (m) = (k+ 1) f (m), f˜ (m) also preferres agglomeration. Clustering of ﬁrms in equilibria is
therefore less than eﬃcient.
Next, suppose that A is characterized by a parameter τ > 0. Noting that h(n) is a linear
function of t = (tij), suppose that hˇ(m) is linear in a parameter t > 0. Then, it follows that
g(m) = f (m)− hˇ(m) = 1
k+ 1
(
f˜ (m)− (k+ 1)hˇ(m)
)
=
1
k+ 1
g˜(m)|t:=(k+1)t .
The relationship implies that, ifm∗ ∈ M locally (globally) maximizes the potential function
g for a parameter pair (τ∗, t∗), then it locally (globally) maximizes the welfare function g˜ for
the pair (τ∗, (k+ 1)t∗). Also, if a spatial patternm cannot globally maximize the potential, it
cannot be a global social optimum. ♦
4.5 The Fujita–Ogawa speciﬁcation
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the simple speciﬁcation of A(m) = (Ai(m))i∈I
and t = (tij)ij∈I×I to derive concrete insights. Under the speciﬁcation, the model can be
interpreted as a discrete-space version of Fujita and Ogawa (1982)’s seminal model.
Assumption 2. Ai(m) = ∑j∈I dijmj where dij = exp
(−τℓij) with τ > 0 and tij = tℓij with
t > 0. ℓij ≥ 0 denotes the distance between cell i, j ∈ I , such that ℓii = 0, ℓi ̸=j > 0, and ℓij = ℓji.
The parameter τ determines how fast technological externalities decay over distance, where
a larger τ indicates a higher decay rate. On the other hand, t > 0 is the commuting cost rate
per unit of distance.18 We note that Assumption 2 is suﬃcient for Assumption 1.19 Also,
Assumption 2 implies that
f (m) =
1
2
m⊤Dm =
1
2 ∑i∈I ∑j∈I
dijmimj (4.10)
where D = [dij]. We conﬁrm that ∇ f (m) = 12 (D+D⊤)m = Dm = A(m) for allm ∈ RI+.
Remark 4. Under the FO speciﬁcation, A is homogeneous of degree 1. The social welfare
function is given by g˜(m) = 2 f (m) − hˇ(m) (see Remark 3). If m∗ ∈ M locally (globally)
18Households’ equilibrium commuting pattern n∗(m) in the lower-stage game may not be unique for the linear
speciﬁcation tij = tℓij (Berliant and Tabuchi, 2018). Minimized total commuting costs, however, are uniquely given
and suﬃce for our analysis of the upper-stage game.
19First, ∇A(m) = D = [dij] satisﬁes Assumption 1 (i). TM is spanned by {zj ≡ ei − ej | j ∈ I \ {i}} where
{ej} is the standard basis and i ∈ I may be arbitrarily chosen. We have (czj)⊤D(czj) = 2c2(1− dij) > 0 for any
c ∈ R because dii = djj = 1, dij = dji, and dij ∈ (0, 1). Second, D = D⊤ since ℓij = ℓji, satisfying Assumption 1 (ii).
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maximizes g(m) for a parameter pair (τ∗, t∗), it locally (globally) maximizes g˜(m) for the pair
(τ∗, 2t∗). ♦
As we reviewed in Section 1, any local potential maximizer for problem (P) is a locally
stable equilibrium under standard myopic dynamics. Also, any global potential maximizer
is a globally stable equilibrium in the sense of stochastic stability, or alternatively selection
under a perfect foresight dynamic. We deﬁne the sets L and G of ﬁrms’ spatial patterns by
L ≡ {The set of localmaximizers for problem (P)} , (4.11)
G ≡ {The set of globalmaximizers for problem (P)} , (4.12)
respectively. Obviously, L and G are parameter dependent, and G ⊂ L ⊂ M. For the remain-
der of the paper, we study the properties of L and G.
In the example sections below, we presume the following condition for simplicity.
Assumption 3 (No excess land supply). (1+ φ)M = 1.
The left-hand side (1 + φ)M is the equilibrium mass of agents, and the right-hand side
is the total supply of land. If (1+ φ)M < 1, then extra land capacity exists in equilibrium.
In certain situations, some ﬁrms (and all their employees) can freely relocate to another cell,
which introduces a nonessential complication.20
5 The two-cell city
This section provides a concrete analysis of spatial equilibria in the model for the simplest
possible two-cell setup (I = 2) to illustrate the basic structure of the model. In particular,
this section addresses the roles of asymmetries in cells’ capacities a = (a1, a2). Section 6 then
focuses on the eﬀects of τ and t by abstracting away all asymmetries across cells.
Let ℓ11 = ℓ22 = 0 and ℓ12 = ℓ21 = 1. Then, d11 = d22 = 1 and d12 = d21 = δ ≡ e−τ, and
t11 = t22 = 0 and t12 = t21 = t. We assume that a1 ≥ a2, i.e., a1 ≥ 12 , without loss of generality.
For simplicity, we take m1 as the variable. To satisfym ∈ M, it must be that m1 ∈ [mˇ, mˆ]
with some mˇ ≥ 0 and mˆ ≤ M.21 Also, let m¯ ≡ M2 and m˜ ≡ a11+φ . Note that m¯, mˇ, m˜, and mˆ are
all independent of the transportation cost parameters t and τ.
If m1 = m˜, then Assumption 3 implies that m = ( a11+φ ,
a2
1+φ ) and that all ﬁrms and their
employees are located in the same cell. Following Fujita and Ogawa (1982), we call it the
integrated pattern. The two patterns m1 = mˇ, mˆ are segregated patterns, since one of the cells
becomes a devoted business center. For instance, m1 = mˆ corresponds to m = (M, 0) (if
M ≤ a1).
To evaluate hˇ, we ﬁrst solve the lower-stage game. Upon inspection, the solution for the
20For an illustration of the eﬀects of dropping Assumption 3, compare the shape of the potential function in
Figure 1 with that of Figure D.4.
21Concretely, mˆ ≡ maxm∈M m1 = min{M, a1} and mˇ ≡ minm∈M m1 = max{0,M− (1− a1)}.
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0 mˇ m¯ m˜ mˆ
0
f (m1)
g(m1)
hˇ(m1)
(a) High t
0 mˇ m¯ m˜ mˆ
0
(b) Medium t
0 mˇ m¯ m˜ mˆ
0
(c) Low t
Figure 1: Graphs of g(m1) for high, medium, and low values of t. We let t = 32 tˆ, t =
2
3 t˜+
1
3 tˆ, and
t = 12 t˜, respectively, where tˆ and t˜ are to be deﬁned in Proposition 4. m1 = m¯ is the minimizer
of f , whereas m1 = m˜ is the maximizer of hˇ. •: local maximizers; ◦: locally minimizing KKT
points. M = 12 , a1 =
3
5 , δ =
1
10 .
lower-stage equilibrium under Assumption 3 is given by:22{
n11 = φm1, n12 = (1+ φ)m2 − a2, rˇ1 = w1 = 0,
n22 = φm2, n21 = 0, rˇ2 = w2 = t,
if mˇ ≤ m1 < m˜, (5.1a){
n11 = φm1, n12 = 0, rˇ1 = w1 = 0,
n22 = φm2, n21 = 0, rˇ2 = w2 = 0,
if m1 = m˜, (5.1b){
n11 = φm1, n12 = 0, rˇ1 = w1 = t,
n22 = φm2, n21 = (1+ φ)m1 − a1, rˇ2 = w2 = 0,
if m˜ < m1 ≤ mˆ. (5.1c)
If m1 = m˜, then all households can reside in the same cells as their workplace, and there are
no inter-cell commutes. In this case, we let rˇi = wi = 0 for both i ∈ I . On the other hand, if
m1 ̸= m˜, then (1+ φ)mi − ai > 0 for one of the cells, meaning that a shortage of labor exists
in cell i and that (1+ φ)mi − ai workers commute to i from the other cell. Here, wi = t is the
minimal possible wage rate in cell i to compensate for commuting costs. The highest bid for
the land rents in each cell i must coincide with its wage rate. Thus, we have rˇi = wi = t.
Employing the analytic solution (5.1), hˇ(m) is expressed in terms of m1:
hˇ(m1) = (1+ φ)t |m1 − m˜| . (5.2)
Similarly, f (m) is expressed as:
f (m1) = (1− δ)(m1 − m¯)2 + (1+ δ)m¯2. (5.3)
where δ = e−τ. As a function of m1, g(m) is computed as g(m1) = f (m1)− hˇ(m1). Problem
(P) is reduced to a maximization of g(m1) over the interval [mˇ, mˆ].
Figure 1 shows the graphs of g, f , and hˇ for three diﬀerent values of t (high, medium, and
low). The functions g, f , and hˇ are extended to be deﬁned over all R, whereas the state space
is the closed interval [mˇ, mˆ]. The potential function g is neither convex nor concave. Points in
22Appendix D explores the two-cell city in detail without Assumption 3.
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t˜ = 0 t∗ tˆ
mˆ
m˜
mˇ
(a) a1 = 0.5
0 t˜ tˇ t∗ tˆ
(b) a1 = 0.65
0 t˜ t∗ tˆ
(c) a1 = 0.8
Figure 2: Local maximizer(s) of g(m1) in the t-axis. M = 0.5. The solid curves: local maxi-
mizers; The broken curves: locally minimizing KKT points; The background: the contours of
g(m1) over (t,m1)-space. G = {mˆ} if t < t∗ and G = {m¯} if t > t∗.
L, the local maximizers of g, are indicated by black marks, and locally minimizing KKT points
are indicated by white circles. All these points are equilibria in the upper-stage game. For the
high-commuting-cost case in Figure 1a, the integrated pattern m1 = m˜ is the only local (and
hence global) maximizer. For the medium-commuting-cost case in Figure 1b, the segregated
patterns and the integrated pattern are the local maximizers. For the low-commuting-cost case
in Figure 1c, only the segregated patterns are the local maximizers.
The following proposition characterizes L and G, the local and global maximizer(s) of g.
Proposition 4. Assume that a1 ≥ 12 . Then, only patterns in {mˇ, m˜, mˆ} ({m˜, mˆ}) can locally
(globally) maximize g(m1) in [mˇ, mˆ]. Let tˇ ≡ 2M(1 − δ)(mˆ − m¯), t˜ ≡ 2M(1 − δ)(m˜ − m¯),
tˆ ≡ 2M(1− δ)(mˆ− m¯), and t∗ ≡ 12 (tˆ+ t˜), with δ ≡ e−τ. Then,
mˇ ∈ L ∀t < tˇ,
m˜ ∈ L ∀t > t˜,
mˆ ∈ L ∀t < tˆ,
and
m˜ ∈ G ∀t ≥ t∗,mˆ ∈ G ∀t ≤ t∗. (5.4)
Proposition 4 states that the integrated pattern (m1 = m˜) is the only possible local max-
imizer for larger values of t, whereas the segregated patterns (m1 = mˇ or mˆ) become local
maximizer(s) for smaller values of t. The integrated pattern should be the only equilibrium
if the commuting cost per distance t is suﬃciently high because the costs of commuting over-
come the beneﬁt of agglomeration. When t is not too high, concentration of ﬁrms can be a
local maximizer when τ is large. For a ﬁrm, proximity to other ﬁrms matters more than higher
wage paid to its employees when τ is small and t is not too high. It is intuitive that m1 = mˇ, a
concentration to a less advantageous cell 2, cannot be a global potential maximizer.
Figure 2 shows local maximizers in terms of m1 in line with varying t. Figure 2a is the
symmetric case (a1 = 12 ), for which we have m˜ = m¯ =
M
2 and tˇ = tˆ and t˜ = 0. Figure 2c
shows a case where cell 1 is so advantageous that a concentration to cell 2 (m1 = mˇ) can never
be an equilibrium. Figure 2b is an intermediate case. Note that, while concentration to either
cell 1 (m1 = mˆ) or cell 2 (m1 = mˇ) can locally maximize g(m1), mˆ is more likely to be a local
maximizer (i.e., tˆ > tˇ). Figure 1 shows snapshots of Figure 2b for three diﬀerent values of t.
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Figure 3: Circular city.
6 Circular city
This section considers a symmetric geography to elucidate the intrinsic role of transportation
cost parameters t and τ. To abstract away the eﬀects of asymmetries across cells, we assume
that the underlying geography is a circle with circumferential length 1, on which cells of the
same size are sequentially placed (Figure 3).
Assumption 4. ℓij = 1I min{|i− j|, I − |i− j|} for all i, j ∈ I . Also, ai = a ≡ 1I for all i ∈ I .
Assumption 4 abstracts away cell-speciﬁc advantages arising from the shape of the under-
lying transportation network or extra capacities, which allows us to isolate the endogenous
forces that determine spatial patterns. For instance, in a line segment, the locations near city
boundaries have fewer opportunities to access other cells. By contrast, in a circle, every cell
has the same level of accessibility as the other cells. In particular, the uniform distribution of
ﬁrms m¯ = (m¯, m¯, . . . , m¯) (m¯ ≡ MI ) is always an equilibrium.
For simplicity, following Fujita and Thisse (2013), Section 6.5, we assume that M = 12 . In
fact, the total mass of ﬁrms M does not aﬀect the qualitative properties of equilibrium spatial
patterns (i.e., integrated or segregated) under Assumption 4.23
Assumption 5. M = 12 .
For the remainder of the paper, we assume Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 5. In addition, to
simplify the analysis, we consider global maximization of the potential function as the equilibrium
reﬁnement criterion There is a pair of useful predictions on the properties G.
Lemma 1. Consider problem (P) under Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 5. Then, the following hold true.
(a) Anym ∈ L, and thus anym ∈ G, should satisfy mi ∈ {0, m¯, a} = {0, m¯, 2m¯} for all i ∈ I .
(b) For any τ > 0, G = {m¯} when t is suﬃciently large.
Condition (a) substantially simpliﬁes the enumeration of relevant spatial conﬁgurations.
It indicates that if m ∈ M locally maximizes g, every cell has to be used either for purely
residential (mi = 0), integrated (mi = m¯), or purely business (mi = a = 2m¯), purposes. For (b),
it would be natural that if t is very large, concentration of ﬁrms is inferior in potential value to
the uniform distribution m¯ because, while f (m) is bounded under Assumption 2, hˇ(m) can
be arbitrarily large in t.
23M acts as a scaling factor for t. See Remark D.2 in Appendix D for the I = 2 example.
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(M, 0, 0)
(0, 0,M)
(0,M, 0)(a, m¯, 0) (m¯, a, 0)
(m¯, m¯, m¯)
(0, m¯, a)
(0, a, m¯)(a, 0, m¯)
(m¯, 0, a)
(a) Agglomeration force f (m) (b) Dispersion force −hˇ(m)
Figure 4: Contours of f (m) and −hˇ(m) for the three-cell city.
(a) t = 0.15 (b) t = 0.05 (c) t = 0.03
Figure 5: Contours of g(m) for the three-cell city (e− τ3 = 0.5,M = 12 ). The coordinate system
is the same as Figure 4. •: local maximizer, ◦: local minimizer or saddle point.
6.1 The three-cell city
Assuming I = 3, this section explores the landscape of the potential function g(m). Because
the basic results are the same with I = 2, we focus on graphical intuitions. Without loss
of generality, we let m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3. Lemma 1 implies that only the uniform distribution
m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯) and the monocentric pattern mˆ ≡ (a, m¯, 0) can be global maximizers of the
potential function.24
Figure 4 shows the contours of f (m) and −hˇ(m) onM employing a simplex coordinate.
The ﬁrst term f (m) is a parabola centered at m¯. As discussed in Section 4.4, it is larger
near the boundary ofM because it corresponds to the agglomeration force in the model. The
second term −hˇ(m) is a piecewise aﬃne function attaining the maximum at m¯.25 It is larger
when m is close to the integrated pattern m¯, as total commuting costs is smaller. Being the
sum of these two terms, working in opposite directions, the potential function g is nonconvex.
Figure 5 shows the contours of g(m) for diﬀerent values of t. The black markers indicate
local maximizers, whereas the white markers indicate other KKT points. For simplicity, only
those KKT points (i.e., equilibria) with m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3 are drawn. Qualitative properties are
24 Note that all the patterns (a, m¯, 0), (0, a, m¯), (m¯, 0, a), (a, 0, m¯), (0, m¯, a), and (m¯, a, 0) are essentially the “same”
spatial pattern and share the same potential value. There are ﬁve other local (global) maximizers of the same
meaning when mˆ = (a, m¯, 0) is a local (global) maximizer of the potential function.
25If we drop Assumption 4 so that ai can vary across cells, −hˇ(m) attains maximum at m˜ = 11+φ (a1, a2, a3),
analogous to the two-cell case with a1 > a2.
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C
C’
A B
B’
U
A’
Cell 1 2 3
(U) m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯)
(C’) (A’) (B’)
(C) (a, M−a2 ,
M−a
2 ) (A) mˆ = (a, m¯, 0) (B) (
M
2 ,
M
2 , 0)
Figure 6: Equilibrium spatial distributions of ﬁrms (I = 3). The left-hand side: a subset ofM
that satisfy m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3. The right-hand side: spatial patterns, with letters corresponding
to those in the contour plot on left-hand side.
consistent with the two-cell example. When t is large, m¯ is the only maximizer. For lower
values of t, there are numerous KKT points, all of which are equilibria in the model. Only m¯
and mˆ can be local maximizers, conﬁrming Lemma 1. The ﬁgure also illustrates the landscape
of the potential function behind the lemma, in that any interior equilibrium with mi ̸= m¯ for
some i is either a local minimizer or a saddle point.
Figure 6 schematically illustrates equilibrium patterns associated with the markers in Fig-
ure 5b, as well as a magniﬁcation of Figure 5b for the subset ofM such that m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3.
Only the uniform distribution m¯ (pattern U) and the monocentric agglomeration mˆ (pattern
A) locally maximize the potential function. Patterns C and B are local minimizers on the
boundaries. Patterns A’, B’, and C’ are interior equilibria which may be interpreted as “in-
between” patterns.
The (possible) number of equilibrium patterns increases considerably (from 5 to 25without
symmetry considerations), merely by moving from I = 2 to I = 3. The majority of equilibria
(18 out of 25) are less important (i.e., local minimizers or saddles). Thus, imposing some
equilibrium reﬁnement is crucial for obtaining meaningful equilibria.
By focusing on patterns that can globally maximize g(m), i.e., m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯) and mˆ =
(a, m¯, 0), we obtain the following characterization. In words, dispersion m¯ is selected when
commuting cost t is large, and agglomeration mˆ is selected when t is small.
Proposition 5. Suppose that I = 3. Let t∗ = 14 (1− δ) with δ ≡ e−
τ
3 . Then, the uniform distribu-
tion m¯ is a global potential maximizer for t ≥ t∗ and the monocentric pattern mˆ is a global potential
maximizer for t ≤ t∗.
6.2 The four- and eight-cell cities
Fujita and Ogawa (1982)’s model describes the formation of multiple urban centers as an equi-
librium outcome. The four-cell city (I = 4) is the minimal setup where the duo-centric pattern
m2 ≡ (a, 0, a, 0) can emerge. If we focus on the set of global maximizers G, however, only
the complete dispersion m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯) and the monocentric pattern m1 ≡ (0, a, a, 0) can
emerge.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that I = 4. Let t∗ ≡ 14 (1− δ2) with δ ≡ e−
τ
4 . Then, only the uniform and
monocentric patterns (m¯ and m1) can be global potential maximizers. The uniform distribution
m¯ is a global potential maximizer for t ≥ t∗ and the monocentric pattern m1 is a global potential
maximizer for t ≤ t∗.
The duo-centric pattern cannot be a global potential maximizer because g(m1) > g(m2)
for all (τ, t). For households, there is no distinction between monocentric and duo-centric
equilibria because in both cases every household commutes to a cell next to its residential cell,
and the equilibrium commuting cost for a household is t4 , implying that hˇ(m
1) = hˇ(m2) = 2×
a× t4 = tm¯. On the other hand, since a monocentric concentrationm1 oﬀers a higher level of
technological externalities for ﬁrms than the duo-centric patternm2, we have f (m1) > f (m2).
For I = 8, on the other hand, commuting length may vary for diﬀerent spatial conﬁgu-
rations. Possible conﬁgurations include the uniform pattern m¯ = (m¯, m¯, . . . , m¯), the mono-
centric patternm1 ≡ (0, 0, a, a, a, a, 0, 0), the duo-centric patternm2 ≡ (0, a, a, 0, 0, a, a, 0), and
the quad-centric pattern m4 ≡ (a, 0, a, 0, a, 0, a, 0). Figure 7a illustrates m¯, m1, m2, and m4,
with arrows indicating households’ commuting patterns. As the commuting cost between two
neighboring cells is tI =
t
8 , a household’s commuting cost in patterns m¯,m
1,m2, andm4 are
given by 0, t8 ,
t
8 , and
t
4 , respectively.
The following proposition characterizes G for I = 8.26
Proposition 7. Suppose I = 8. Then, only uniform, monocentric, and duo-centric patterns (m¯,
m1, andm2) can be global potential maximizer(s). There exists τ∗ such that:
(a) If τ ≤ τ∗, then there exists t∗ such that (i) the uniform pattern m¯ is a global maximizer for
t ≥ t∗ and (ii) the monocentric patternm1 is a global maximizer for t ≤ t∗.
(b) If τ > τ∗, then there exist t∗∗ and t∗∗∗ with t∗∗ > t∗∗∗ such that (i) the uniform pattern m¯
is a global maximizer for t ≥ t∗∗, (ii) the duo-centric pattern m2 is a global maximizer for
t∗∗∗ ≤ t ≤ t∗∗, and (iii) the monocentric patternm1 is a global maximizer for t ≤ t∗∗∗.
It is far simpler to visualize Proposition 7 in the (τ, t)-space. Figure 7b shows a partitioning
of the (τ, t)-space on the basis of G. The letters U, M, and D in each region correspond, respec-
tively, to the uniform, monocentric, and duo-centric patterns (m¯, m1, m2). When t is large,
agglomeration cannot occur, and the uniform distribution is the global maximizer. Analogous
to the two- and three-cell cases, a concentration of ﬁrms is possible if t is suﬃciently small,
where the beneﬁt of proximity overcomes ﬁrms’ costs. When the decay rate τ is small, the
monocentric pattern is chosen. When τ is large, a new phenomenon emerges: duo-centric
pattern becomes the global maximizer of the potential. When spillover from one cell to its
neighbor is low (τ is high) and commuting cost t is intermediate, the beneﬁt of agglomeration
cannot compensate for longer households commutes.
A rough intuitive rationale behind the emergence of the duo-centric pattern when τ is
large is as follows. Suppose that τ is large or that δ = e− τ8 is small, so that either δ2, δ3, or δ4
is negligibly small. Then, consider the third cell from the left in Figure 7a. In the monocentric
26The quad-centric patternm4 cannot be in G because g(m2) > g(m4) for all (τ, t), analogous to the I = 4 case.
19
(M)m1 = (0, 0, a, a, a, a, 0, 0)
(D)m2 = (0, a, a, 0, 0, a, a, 0)
m4 = (a, 0, a, 0, a, 0, a, 0)
(U) m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯)
(a) Representative spatial patterns. (b) Partition based on G.
Figure 7: Partition based on G and associated spatial patterns (I = 8). The letter on each
region in Figure 7b corresponds to that in Figure 7a.
pattern m1, the cell is located at a boundary of the business center. The production level in
the cell is given by:
(
1+ δ+ δ2 + δ3
)
a ≈ (1+ δ)a,
whereas ﬁrms’ operating costs in the cell are (1+ φ)× 2t8 = t2 . On the other hand, every ﬁrm
in the duo-centric patternm2, including the third cell, enjoys the following production level:(
1+ δ+ δ3 + δ4
)
a ≈ (1+ δ)a,
whereas ﬁrms’ operating costs are (1+ φ)× t8 = t4 . Thus, ﬁrms in the two boundary cells of
the single business center in m1 have an incentive to deviate toward the duo-centric pattern
m2 when δ is small (τ is large). The positive spillover is too low to compensate for higher
operating costs when τ is large.
6.3 A city with a large number of cells
The above analyses for small Is have demonstrated that multiple-center equilibria can be local
and global potential maximizers in the model. This exploratory section provides an additional
numerical investigation into the case when the number of cells I is extremely large.
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to a collection of symmetric spatial distributions
of ﬁrms: the uniform pattern (or the integrated pattern) m¯ = (m¯, m¯, . . . , m¯) and symmetric
J-centric segregated patternsmJ (J = 1, 2, . . .). The latter are spatial patterns of ﬁrms such that
mJ =
(
mˇJ , mˇJ . . . , mˇJ︸ ︷︷ ︸
J times
)
where mˇJ ≡
(
0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
4J times
, a, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
2J times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
4J times
)
(6.1)
where each mˇJ is interpreted as an urban subcenter with a self-contained job market.27 For
27There are I2J purely business cells and
I
2J purely residential cells in each mˇJ .
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(a) Uniform m¯ (b) Monocenterm1 (c) Duo-centerm2 (d) Tri-centerm3 (e) Quad-centerm4
Figure 8: Symmetric patterns inM∗ (I = 4LCM(4) = 48).
all mJ to exist up to K-center pattern (K ≥ 1), I4J must be an integer for all J ≤ K. That is,
I = 4LCM(K) where LCM(K) denotes the least common multiple of {1, 2, 3, . . . ,K}.28
LetM∗ ≡ {m¯,m1,m2, . . . ,mK} denote the set of symmetric spatial distributions. Figure
8 illustrates the patterns in M∗ when I = LCM(4) = 48. We consider global maximization
of the potential function g(m) overM∗. The conjecture behind this analysis is formalized as
follows.
Conjecture 1. Suppose I = 4LCM(K) (K ≥ 1). Let G∗ be the set of global potential maximizers
amongM∗. Then, G = G∗.
The conjecture is, if m ∈ M∗ has the maximum potential value among the patterns in
M∗, then it globally maximizes g over M, and vice versa. Propositions 6 and 7 support the
conjecture for K = 1 and K = 2 (i.e., I = 4 and I = 8), respectively, since M∗ = {m¯,m1}
for K = 1 andM∗ = {m¯,m1,m2} for K = 2. Also, a possible local maximizer other than the
symmetric patterns M∗ can be regarded as a transitional pattern connecting two symmetric
patterns.29 Thus, it is expected that G∗ provides at least an approximate view of the overall
properties of G.
Figure 9 shows a partition of the (τ, t)-space on the basis of G∗, i.e., the global potential
maximizer amongM∗, when K = 50.30 Segregated patterns {mJ}KJ=1 dominate the integrated
pattern m¯ in the gray regions, whereas the uniform distribution is the global potential maxi-
mizer in the white region. Each gray region corresponds to one of the J-centric patterns, and
the number on each region corresponds to the number of business centers J. On the τ-axis,
gray regions are aligned in the increasing order of J.
Figure 9 has two basic implications. One is the eﬀect of the commuting cost parameter t,
and the other is the eﬀect of the distance decay parameter τ.
Observation 3. Fix τ > 0, suppose that t is very large initially, and consider a monotonic decrease
in t. Then, the global maximizer of g acrossM∗ is given by the following sequence: m¯ → mJ∗ →
mJ
∗−1 → · · · →m2 →m1 for some J∗ ≥ 1. ♦
Multiple business centers are formed from uniformity and then the number of business
centers decreases as t decreases from a larger extreme. For instance, let τ = 25 and consider a
28For instance, I = 4, 8, 12, 48, 240, 240, 1, 680, and 3, 360 for each 1 ≤ K ≤ 8.
29For example, (0, a, m¯, m¯) can be a local maximizer when I = 4. It connects two patterns (0, a, 0, a) and (0, a, a, 0).
See Proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix A.
30In favor of eﬃciency of numerical computation, we employ a continuous version of the potential function g to
draw Figure 9. See Appendix E for details.
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(a) Overview [τ ∈ (0, 200)] (b) Magniﬁcation [τ ∈ (0, 50)]
Figure 9: Partition of the (τ, t)-space based on G∗. The white region indicates that G∗ =
{m¯}. The gray regions indicate that one of the symmetric segregated patterns {mJ} globally
maximizes g amongM∗; the number in each region indicates the number of subcenters J.
decrease of t (the vertical broken line in Figure 9b). When t is suﬃciently large, m¯maximizes
g (Lemma 1 (b)). But when t decreases and cuts a threshold,m4 emerges as the global potential
maximizer in M∗. As t decreases further, the potential maximizer sequentially switches, as
m4 →m3 →m2 →m1.31
Observation 4. Fix a suﬃciently small t > 0, suppose that τ is very small initially, and consider
a monotonic increase in τ. Then, the global maximizer of g across M∗ is given by the following
sequence: m¯→m1 →m2 →m3 → · · · . ♦
A monotonic increase in the number of subcenters occurs when τ monotonically increases
with a given t. For instance, let t = 0.08 and consider a monotonic increase in τ (the horizontal
broken line in Figure 9b). For small τ, the uniform distribution m¯ has the maximum potential
value on this line. A steady increase in τ induces a repetitive emergence of segregated patterns,
with an increasing number of subcenters J as the global potential maximizer inM∗.
If Conjecture 1 is true, Observations 3 and 4 generalize the implications of Proposition 7:
when t is large, segregation cannot become a global maximizer; when t is not too large, then
the number of business centers increases as decay rate τ rises.
7 Concluding remarks
Building on the seminal framework by Fujita and Ogawa (1982), this paper considered the
emergence of multiple business centers in the cities. A potential game approach is shown
to be eﬃcacious for the analysis of the model. Through local and global maximizations of the
potential function, we characterized stable spatial equilibria in the model. Our results provide
an answer to the long-standing stability issue of polycentric equilibria of the FO model. We
31Figure E.7a and Figure E.7b in Appendix E show graphs of potential values for the symmetric patterns over
the vertical and horizontal broken lines in Figure 9b (τ = 25 and t = 0.08), respectively.
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also demonstrated that the model can have multiple local maximizers of the potential function.
The results presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that equilibrium reﬁnement based on
global maximization of the potential function makes the discussion cleaner, without aﬀecting
the basic implications of the model.
When t is large, the uniform distribution becomes the only global potential maximizer.
When commuting costs are too large, ﬁrms cannot compensate its employees for their com-
muting costs with wage, because their production level is ﬁnite. We note that households’
commuting costs has two interpretations. On the one hand, as emphasized in Sections 4, 5,
and 6, they acts as dispersion forces from a ﬁrm’s perspective. On the other hand, they can also
be interpreted as an inter-type agglomeration force (or co-location force) that glues ﬁrms and
households together (cf., Papageorgiou and Thisse, 1985). When t is large, the co-location
force become strong, and the integration (the uniform pattern) emerges as the global potential
maximizer.
When t is relatively small, segregation of ﬁrms and households can occur to form disjointed
business districts (provided that the number of cells I are suﬃciently large to express such
patterns). Sections 6.2 and 6.3 illustrated that the number of business centers increases as τ
increases. As τ grows large, the contributions of positive spillovers from ﬁrms in distant cells
become negligible. At some point, ﬁrms can no longer pay the higher land rents and wages
required to support the emergence of large business clusters.
There are several topics that worth further exploration. First, relaxing the simplifying
assumptions in the basic framework (Section 3) would be important to provide policy impli-
cations. In particular, following Fujita and Ogawa (1982), we assume a ﬁxed demand for land,
which should be relaxed. To this end, the potential game approach is eﬀective for any exten-
sions that preserve the symmetry of externalities.32 Second, for a given speciﬁcation of A(m)
or t (e.g., Assumption 2), the optimization representation (P) can be employed to study various
assumptions about the transportation network of a city, i.e., the geographical distances {ℓij}
between cells, including a line segment as in the original FO paper, or a variety of stylized but
interesting geographies, as in the paper by Matsuyama (2017).
32The Negishi’s theorem (Negishi, 1960) implies that any competitive assumptions may be reduced to maximiz-
ing a speciﬁc kind of welfare function. The optimal value of a welfare function, in turn, acts as a potential function
of the associated game when the mass of agents in each cell is taken as a variable.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 〈p,x〉 ≡ p⊤x = ∑i∈I pixi. With multipliers w = (wi) ∈ RI+, r =
(ri) ∈ RI+, v∗, and pi∗, deﬁne the LagrangianL for problem (P0) by
L =− f (m) + h(n) +
〈
r,−a+m+
(
I⊗ 1⊤I
)
n
〉
+
〈
w, φm−
(
1⊤I ⊗ I
)
n
〉
+
〈
v∗,1⊤I2n− N
〉
+
〈
pi∗,1⊤I m−M
〉
,
where I is the I-dimensional identity matrix and 1K denotes the K-dimensional all-one vec-
tor. The ﬁrst-order optimality condition with respect to the Lagrangian L coincides with the
equilibrium conditions listed in Deﬁnition 1.
Proof for Proposition 2. Deﬁne the LagrangianL for problem (S) by
L = h(n) +
〈
rˇ,−a+m+
(
I⊗ 1⊤I
)
n
〉
+
〈
w, φm−
(
1⊤I ⊗ I
)
n
〉
.
Then, the ﬁrst-order optimality condition with respect to L coincides with the conditions in
Deﬁnition 2. (D) is the Lagrangian dual problem for (S) and obtained by taking infn≥0L .
Proof for Proposition 3. Deﬁne the LagrangianL for problem (P) by
L = − f (m) + hˇ(m) + 〈rˆ,−a+m〉+
〈
pi∗,1⊤m−M
〉
.
Then, the ﬁrst-order optimality condition with respect to L is equivalent to the conditions in
Deﬁnition 3 as well as the equilibrium conditions of the model (Deﬁnition 1).
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma is a corollary of the following Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1. Suppose Assumptions 2, 3 and 4. Then, the following properties holds true for (P).
(a) The uniform distribution m¯ is a local maximizer for all (τ, t).
(b) m¯ is the unique global maximizer when t is suﬃciently large.
(c) Any interior KKT point other than m¯ (if it exists) is a local minimizer or a saddle point.
(d) No local maximizer involves more than one “unbalanced” cells, i.e., cells withmi > 0,∑j∈I nij >
0, and φmi ̸= ∑j∈I nij so that there must be commuting from or toward the cell.
(e) If in addition Assumption 5 holds true, no local maximizer involves unbalanced mixed use
cells.
Proof. (a) m¯ is a local minimizer of hˇ with hˇ(m¯) = 0. Evidently, we have hˇ(m¯+ ϵ) > 0 for
any nonzero ϵ ∈ TM under Assumption 3. Since hˇ(m) is a piecewise aﬃne function, m¯ is an
isolated local minimizer of hˇ for any t > 0. Similarly, for ϵ ∈ TM, deﬁne f˜ (ϵ) ≡ f (m¯+ ϵ) =
f (ϵ) + f (m¯) (see (D.8) of Proof of Proposition D.1 in Appendix D). We have ∇ f˜ (0) = 0. It
follows that m¯ is a local maximizer of g(m) = f (m)− hˇ(m) for any ﬁnite t > 0.
(b) For anly spatial distribution m ∈ M we compute ∆g(m) ≡ g(m)− g(m¯) = f (m−
m¯)− hˇ(m) by (D.8) and hˇ(m¯) = 0. The ﬁrst term is bounded above by 12 m¯21⊤D1, which is
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ﬁnite for any τ > 0. There exists t∗ such that ∆g(m) < 0 for anym whenever t > t∗ because
hˇ(m) is a nonzero linear function of t whenm ̸= m¯.
(c) Suppose thatm ̸= m¯ is an interior equilibrium. Then, by deﬁnition there exists pi and
c = (ci) such that c = Dm − pi1 ≥ 0 and g(m) = f (m) − c⊤(m − m¯), where c > 0 iﬀ
m = m¯. Suppose thatm ̸= m¯ and take z ≡ ϵ(m− m¯) ∈ TM\ {0} with some ϵ > 0. Then,
g(m+ z) = 12 (m+ z)
⊤D(m+ z)− c⊤(m− m¯+ z)
= 12m
⊤Dm− c⊤(m− m¯) + z⊤D(m+ z)− c⊤z
= g(m) + z⊤D(m+ z)− z⊤(Dm− pi1) = g(m) + z⊤Dz > g(m),
where we note that z⊤1 = 0 and thus Assumption 1 (ii) implies z⊤Dz > 0 because z ̸= 0. It
shows that any interior equilibriumm other than m¯ is a local minimizer of g on the subspace
spanned by z = m− m¯. Therefore,m is either a local minimizer or a saddle point of g.
(d) Suppose thatm is a boundary equilibrium with at least two unbalancedmixed-use cells
j and k. Becausem is an equilibrium, there exist {ci} and pi such that ci = ∑j dijmj − pi for all
i with mi > 0. Then, following the same procedure as in (a) with z ≡ ϵ(ej − ek) ∈ TM with
ei being the ith standard basis, one shows thatm is a local minimizer along the extreme line
spanned by z, thereby showing the claim.
(e) Under Assumption 5, if a cell is unbalanced, then there must be another unbalanced
cell. By (d), such KKT point (if exits) cannot be a local maximizer.
Proof of Proposition 4. Noting that g′′(m1) = 2(1− δ) > 0, g(m1) is piecewise strictly convex.
Since hˇ(m1) has only one kink (at m1 = m˜), there is at most three local maximizers, i.e., mˇ, m˜,
and mˆ. The left and right derivatives of g(m1) at m1 = m˜ are, respectively, given by
g′−(m˜) = 2(1− δ)(m˜− m¯) + (1+ φ)t and g′+(m˜) = 2(1− δ)(m˜− m¯)− (1+ φ)t. (A.1)
For m1 = m˜ to be a local maximizer, we must have g′−(m˜) > 0 and g′+(m˜) < 0, which reduces
to t > t˜ ≡ 2M(1− δ)(m˜ − m¯) as we note 11+φ = M under Assumption 3. At m1 = mˆ, we
compute
g′(mˆ) = 2(1− δ)min{m¯, a1 − m¯} − (1+ φ)t, (A.2)
so that g′(mˆ) > 0 implies that t < 2M(1− δ)min{a1 − m¯, m¯}. At m1 = mˇ, we compute
g′(mˇ) = 2(1− δ)max{−m¯, m¯− (1− a1)}+ (1+ φ)t (A.3)
so that g′(mˇ) < 0 implies t < 2M(1− δ)min{m¯, (1− a1)− m¯}. Summarizing the above con-
ditions, we shows that assertions concerning L. The assertions on G are given by a simple
comparison of the potential values for mˇ, m˜, and mˆ.
Proof of Proposition 5. It suﬃces to investigate g(m) on the extreme line from m¯ to mˆ:
g¯(ϵ) ≡ g(m¯+ ϵ(e1 − e3)) = f (m¯) + (1− δ)ϵ2 − 2m¯t ((1+ φ)(m¯+ ϵ)− a) (A.4)
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(c) Vertices ofM′
Figure A.1:M′ and associated spatial patterns (I = 4).
where ϵ ∈ (0, m¯). Note that t3 = 2m¯t. We note that 2(m¯ + ϵ) − a is the shortage of labor in
cell 1, i.e., the mass of commuters. Note that ϵ = 0 (ϵ = m¯) corresponds to m¯ (mˆ). We have
g¯′(0) = −2m¯(1+ φ)t < 0 and g¯′(m¯) = 2m¯(1− δ) − 2m¯(1+ φ)t. mˆ is a local maximizer iﬀ
g¯′(m¯) > 0, i.e., t < 11+φ (1− δ) = 12 (1− δ). Also, g¯(0) ≥ g¯(m¯) is equivalent to t ≥ 14 (1− δ).
Proof of Proposition 6. For symmetry, we may focus on the following subset ofM:
M′ ≡ {m ∈ M | m1 ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}, m2 ≥ m4, m1 +m3 ≥ 2m¯} . (A.5)
For instance, (2m¯, m¯, m¯, 0) ∈ M∗ but (0, 2m¯, m¯, m¯) /∈ M′. Figure A.1 illustrates the convex
polyhedronM′ with associated spatial patterns.
From Lemma 1, L (and G) restricted toM′ should consist of the following patterns: m¯ =
(m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯), m˜1 = (a, m¯, 0, m¯), m˜2 = (a, m¯, m¯, 0), mˆ1 = (a, a, 0, 0), and mˆ2 = (a, 0, a, 0).
Observe that all points other than m¯ is located on the surface ofM.
Proposition 6 is a corollary of the following proposition. In the main text, we employ
(0, a, a, 0) instead of mˆ1 = (a, a, 0, 0) for the ease of interpretation at the ﬁrst glance.
Proposition A.1. Suppose I = 4 and let t∗ ≡ 12 (1− δ2), t∗∗ ≡ 12 (1− δ)2, and t∗∗∗ ≡ 12 (1− δ)
with δ ≡ e− τ4 . Then,
m¯ ∈ L ∀t > 0
mˆ1 ∈ L ∀t < t∗
mˆ2 ∈ L ∀t < t∗∗
m˜1 ∈ L ∀t ∈ ( 12 t∗, t∗)
m˜2 ∈ L ∀t ∈ (t∗∗∗, δt∗∗∗)
and
m¯ ∈ G ∀t ≥ 12 t∗mˆ1 ∈ G ∀t ≤ 12 t∗ . (A.6)
Proof. Let p′(x; z) denote the one-sided directional derivative: p′(x; z) ≡ limϵ→+0(p(x +
ϵz) − p(x))/ϵ. Note that at any state m ∈ M, the directional derivative of f ′(m; z) to-
ward z ∈ TM is given by f ′(m; z) = m⊤Dz = A(m)⊤z. For instance, when z = ej − ei,
f ′(m; z) = Aj(m)− Ai(m). Note that t4 = 2m¯t and a = 2m¯.
(i) The uniform pattern m¯ = (m¯, m¯, m¯, m¯) is a local maximizer for all δ and t (Lemma 1).
26
(ii) Themonocentric pattern mˆ1 = (2m¯, 2m¯, 0, 0) is a local maximizer if and only if all of the
directional derivatives g′(mˆ1; z) with z ∈ {z23, z24, z14 + z23} are negative, where zij = ej− ei
expresses a marginal replacement of ﬁrms from cell i to j.33 The directions corresponds to the
lines connecting mˆ1 to other possible local maximizers {m˜2, m˜1, m¯}. We compute that
g′(mˆ1; z14 + z23) = −4m¯(1− δ2) + 4m¯(1+ φ)t = 2g′(mˆ1; z23) = 2g′(mˆ1; z24).
Thus, mˆ1 is a local maximizer of g when t < 11+φ (1− δ2) = 18 (1− δ2).
(iii) The duocentric pattern mˆ2 = (2m¯, 0, 2m¯, 0) is a local maximizer if and only if all of the
directional derivatives g′(mˆ2; z) with z ∈ {z12 + z34, z32, z32 + z34} are negative. We compute
that
g′(mˆ2; z12 + z34) = g′(mˆ2; z32 + z34) = −4m¯(1− δ)2 + 4m¯(1+ φ)t = 2g′(mˆ2; z32)
Thus, mˆ1 is a local maximizer of g when t < 11+φ (1− δ)2.
(iv) The pattern m˜1 ≡ (2m¯, m¯, 0, m¯) is a local maximizer if and only if all of the directional
derivatives g′(m˜2; z) with z ∈ {z13, z42, z23 + z43} are negative. We compute that
g′(m˜1; z13) = −2m¯(1− δ2) + 2m¯(1+ φ)t, (A.7)
g′(m˜1; z42) = −2m¯(1+ φ)t < 0, (A.8)
g′(m˜1; z23 + z43) = −2m¯(1− δ2)− 4m¯(1+ φ)t. (A.9)
It implies that m˜1 is a local maximizer if and only if 12(1+φ) (1− δ2) < t < 11+φ (1− δ2).
(v) The pattern m˜2 ≡ (2m¯, m¯, m¯, 0) is a local maximizer if and only if all of the directional
derivatives g′(m˜2; z) with z ∈ {z14, z23, z32, z34} are negative. We compute that
g′(m˜2; z14) = −2m¯(1− δ) + 2m¯(1+ φ)t, (A.10)
g′(m˜2; z23) = 2m¯δ(1− δ)− 2m¯(1+ φ)t, (A.11)
g′(m˜2; z32) = −2m¯δ(1− δ)− 2m¯(1+ φ)t < 0, (A.12)
g′(m˜2; z34) = −m¯(1− δ)2 − 2m¯(1+ φ)t < 0. (A.13)
Thus, m˜2 is a local maximizer if and only if 11+φδ(1− δ) < t < 11+φ (1− δ).
The claims concerning G follows by a comparison of the potential values for m¯, mˆ1, mˆ2,
m˜1, and m˜2.
Figure A.2 shows the contour of g(m) on the polyhedron spanned by {m¯, mˆ1, mˆ2} for dif-
ferent values of t. Figure A.3 shows the partition of (τ, t)-space according to Proposition A.1.
Observe that the partition based on L (Figure A.3b) become very complicated. The basic in-
tuitions, however, does not change from that obtained by G (Figure A.3c). Under ﬁxed δ, high
(low) t encourages dispersion (agglomeration) of ﬁrms.
Proof of Proposition 7. Employing Lemma 1, one can enumerate all relevant spatial patterns
33If all of the directional derivatives are negative, it implies that the gradient of g points outward the polyhedron
spannedM′. For symmetry, it is the condition that the point is a local maximizer of g inM.
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Figure A.2: Contours of g(m) over the polygon spanned by {mˆ2, mˆ1, m¯}. δ = 0.1. •: points
in L.
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Figure A.3: Partitions of (δ, t)-space (I = 4). In (a) and (b), the numbers over a region indicate
the patterns in L for the region. For instance, 1ˆ1˜2˜ means that mˆ1, m˜2, m˜1 ∈ L. Also note that
m¯ ∈ L for all δ and t. (b) shows the partition for only m˜1 and m˜2.
such that mi ∈ {0, m¯, a} = {0, m¯, 2m¯} for all i ∈ I , which we refrain from explicitly listing up
here. The proposition follows by just comparing the potential values for the spatial patterns.
We note that, for any m ∈ M, hˇ(m) is computed by hˇ(m) = tI ∑Ii=1 |Mi − Ni − α| where
Mi ≡ ∑ik=1 mk, Ni ≡ ∑ik=1(a−mk), and α is the median of {Mi−Ni}i∈I (see Rabin et al., 2011).
The threshold values τ∗, t∗, t∗∗, and t∗∗∗ are given by τ∗ = −8 log(δ∗) with δ∗ ≡ 16 (
√
13− 1),
and t∗ = 2m¯(1− δ)(1+ δ)(1+ δ+ δ2), t∗∗ = 4m¯(1− δ)2(1+ δ)2, and t∗∗∗ = 4m¯δ(1− δ)(1+
δ)(1+ 2δ) where δ = e− τ8 .
B Non-atomic potential games
The precise deﬁnitions of non-atomic game and non-atomic potential game in this paper may be
formalized as follows:
Deﬁnition B.1 (Nonatomic game). LetQ ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,Q} be a set of agent types, where Q is the
number of types. Let Sq = {1, 2, . . . , Sq} be the set of strategies for type q ∈ Q agents, where
Sq is the number of strategies. Let X ⊂ RS+, where S ≡ ∑q∈Q Sq, denote the set of all possible
strategy distributions, which is assumed to be closed and convex. A non-atomic game is a tuple
(S , F) of the product of the strategy sets S ≡ ∏q∈Q Sq and the payoﬀ function F : X → RS
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that assigns a state x ∈ X the payoﬀ for each strategy in S .
Deﬁnition B.2 (Nonatomic potential game). A non-atomic game (S ,X , F) is a potential game
if there exists a scalar-valued potential function g on a neighborhood of X such that
∂g(x)
∂xqi
= Fqi (x) ∀i ∈ S , q ∈ Q (B.1)
for almost all x ∈ X , where Fqi is the payoﬀ for an agent taking strategy i ∈ Sq and xqi is the
mass of such agents in population q ∈ Q.
Remark B.1. Deﬁnition B.1 is a simple generalization of the standard deﬁnition of non-atomic
games with multiple types, or population games as synthesized by Sandholm (2010). The stan-
dard deﬁnition assumes that the state space X is the product of (Sq − 1)-simplexes X =
∏q∈Q X q where X q ≡ {x ∈ RSq+ | ∑i∈Sq xqi = Xq} and Xq > 0 is the total mass of agents
in population q ∈ Q. Deﬁnition B.2 is a non-atomic version of generalized Nash equilibrium
problems introduced by Facchinei and Kanzow (2007) in the context of games with atomic
players. A simple example is games with entry and exit (Sandholm, 2010, Exercise 3.1.8). ♦
Remark B.2. Deﬁnition B.2 assumes that g is deﬁned on a neighborhood of X , not on X , so
the partial derivative (B.1) is well-deﬁned. It is noted that, since we assume general convex
state spaces, Deﬁnition B.2 is a non-atomic version of generalized potential games introduced by
Facchinei et al. (2011) in the context of games with atomic players. ♦
By employing Proposition 1, we can deﬁne an equivalent non-atomic potential game (Def-
inition B.2) for the model laid out in Section 3.
Observation B.1. The FO framework (Section 3) is a non-atomic potential game with two types of
agents, i.e., Q = {ﬁrms, households}. The strategy sets of ﬁrms and households are I and I × I ,
respectively. The state space X ⊂ RI+I2+ is given by the set of all feasible spatial distributions
m = (mi)i∈I and commuting patterns n = (nij)ij∈I×I :
X ≡
{
(m,n) ∈ RI+ ×RI
2
+
∣∣∣ s.t. (3.12), (3.13), and (3.9)} , (B.2)
which is closed and convex. The respective payoﬀ functions of ﬁrms and households are:
(ﬁrms) Fi(m,n) = Ai(m) ∀i ∈ I , (B.3)
(households) Fij(m,n) = −tij ∀ij ∈ I × I , (B.4)
Deﬁne the function g : RI+ ×RI2+ → R by g(m,n) = f (m)− h(n) with f (m) and h(n) in (3.11)
and (3.10). Then, g is a potential function for the above payoﬀ functions because ∂g(m,n)∂mi = Ai(m)
and ∂g(m,n)∂nij = −tij for allm ∈ RI+ and n ∈ RI
2
+ . ♦
As a non-atomic game, the model involves nonstandard constraints in the state space X ,
the supply constraints (3.12) and (3.13) that determine the admissible pairs of strategy dis-
tributions (m,n). Such game can introduce subtleties from an evolutionary perspective. For
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instance, when a cell is completely occupied by ﬁrms, households may not be able to choose
the cell as their residential location. Thus, a dynamic for the game thus should express state-
dependent interactions between the strategy switching behaviors of ﬁrms and households to
respect supply constraints. Technically, one has to deﬁne appropriate dynamics whose orbits
always stay in X .
The reduction considered in Section 4 is meant to alleviate the subtlety discussed above.
Interactions between ﬁrms and households are encapsulated by the lower-stage game and the
resulting function hˇ(m). The state space in the upper stage M, which consists only of the
simplex constraint and the capacity constraints mi ≤ ai, is independent of the strategy distri-
bution of households n.
Remark B.3. The projection dynamic (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993) is well-deﬁned for non-
atomic games in Deﬁnition B.1, because the dynamic was originally developed for general
convex state spaces. Other standard evolutionary dynamics in the literature, designed to be
well-deﬁned on the simplex (or products of them), may not remain in X in (B.2). Therefore,
appropriate modiﬁcations, e.g., a projection step onto X , are required. ♦
Remark B.4. In standard multiple-type non-atomic games, or population games, such inter-
type interactions are summarized in the payoﬀ function, and the strategy distributions only
have simplex constraints (Remark B.1). In the model presented in Section 3, if (i) there is a
ﬁxed mass N of households and (ii) r and w can be obtained as simple functions of (m,n),
one can deﬁne Fi(m,n) = Ai(m) − φwi(m,n) − ri(m,n) and Fij(m,n) = wi(m,n) − tij −
ri(m,n) as the respective payoﬀ functions for ﬁrms and households. The state space then
becomes X = {(m,n) ∈ RI+ ×RI2+ | ∑i∈ mi = M, ∑ij∈I×I nij = N}, reducing to a standard
instance of multiple-type non-atomic games as laid out in Sandholm (2010). ♦
Observe that the lower- and upper-stage games are both an instance of non-atomic poten-
tial game, as in Deﬁnition B.2.
Observation B.2. The lower-stage game is a non-atomic potential game with strategy set I × I ,
state space N (m), payoﬀ function F : RI2+ → RI2+ in (B.4), and potential function h : RI2+ → R in
(3.10). ♦
Observation B.3. Suppose Assumption 1 (ii). Then, the upper-stage game is a non-atomic potential
game with strategy set I , state spaceM, payoﬀ function pˇi : M → RI , and the potential function
g : RI+ → R employed in the main text. ♦
Remark B.5. Regarding Deﬁnition B.2, it is also noted that we require diﬀerentiability of the
potential function g for almost all x ∈ RS+, whereas the standard deﬁnition of non-atomic po-
tential games in the literature by Sandholm (2001) requires diﬀerentiability for all admissible
x. This modiﬁcation is required because the optimal value function of (S), hˇ, can be nondiﬀer-
entiable in the standard sense.
The function hˇ is instead subdiﬀerentiable. That is, c(m) is a subgradient, or an element of
subdiﬀerential:
∂hˇ(m) ≡
{
z ∈ RI
∣∣∣ f (m′) ≥ f (m) + z⊤(m′ −m), ∀m′ ∈ M} . (B.5)
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This observation follows because (D) has a bounded solution for all m ∈ M, hˇ takes a ﬁnite
value and a bounded c(m) exists for allm ∈ M. See Rockafellar (1970) (Section 23). As illus-
trated by Figures 1, 4b, and D.4, hˇ is in fact diﬀerentiable (i.e., subdiﬀerential is a singleton)
almost everywhere inM, and (4.7) holds true for almost allm ∈ M. ♦
C Alternative decompositions
In the main text, we decomposed the original model into a two-stage game, to reduce it to a
non-atomic game where ﬁrms are the only agents. Technically, this corresponds to partition-
ing of the optimization problem (P0), or Benders’ Decomposition after Benders (1962); Geof-
frion (1972). In this Appendix, we brieﬂy summarize two alternative decompositions, each
corresponding to a diﬀerent interpretation of the model. (The properties of equilibria are un-
aﬀected.) The reformulations can be in turn employed as a building blocks of extensions.
C.1 Households choose only job location in the lower stage
Suppose that households ﬁrst choose job locations in the lower stage and then residential
locations in the upper stage. Denote the residential location distribution of households by
N ≡ (Ni)i∈I , where Ni ≥ 0 is the mass of households residing in cell i ∈ I . The problem (P0)
is equivalent to the following problem:
max
m∈M,n≥0
f (m)− h(n) (C.1a)
s.t. mi + Ni ≤ ai [ri] ∀i ∈ I , (C.1b)
∑
i∈I
nij ≥ φmj [wj] ∀j ∈ I , (C.1c)
∑
j∈I
nij = Ni [vi] ∀i ∈ I . (C.1d)
Analogous to (S) and (D) in the main text, the following problem characterizes households’
equilibrium behavior in the lower-stage game.
min
n≥0 ∑i∈I
h(m), s.t. (C.1c) and (C.1d). (C.2)
max
(v,w)≥0
−∑
i∈I
Nivi +∑
i∈I
φmiwi, s.t. vi ≥ wj − tij ∀i, j ∈ I . (C.3)
where vi can be interpreted as the maximum possible payoﬀ of households obtained by resid-
ing in i ∈ I . Denote a solution for (C.3) by {wi(m,N), vi(m,N)}.
The set of all feasible assignments of ﬁrms and households (m,N) is
X1 ≡
{
(m,N) ∈ RI+ ×RI+
∣∣∣ mi + Ni ≤ ai ∀i ∈ I , m ∈ M} , (C.4)
which is a closed and convex set. Let h1(m,N) be the optimal value function of the problems
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(C.2) and (C.3). Then, it follows that
∂h1(m,N)
∂mi
= φwi(m,N) and
∂h1(m,N)
∂Ni
= −vi(m,N) (C.5)
almost everywhere. Let g1 be deﬁned by g1(m,N) ≡ f (m)− h1(m,N). Then, we have
∂g1(m,N)
∂mi
= Ai(m)− φwi(m,N) and ∂g1(m,N)
∂Ni
= vi(m,N) (C.6)
almost everywhere. Also, (C.1) is equivalent to the problem max(m,n)∈X1 g1(m,N). If we
interpret Ai(m)− φwi(m,N) and vi(m,N) as the payoﬀ functions of ﬁrms and households,
respectively, the upper stage game may be interpreted as a non-atomic potential game.
C.2 Households choose only residential location in the lower stage
Next, suppose that households ﬁrst choose their residential locations in the lower stage and
then job locations in the upper stage. Denote the job distribution over households by N ≡
(Nj)j∈I in the lower-stage game, where, with notational abuse, Nj ≥ 0 is the mass of house-
holds working in cell j ∈ I . The problem (P0) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
m∈M,n≥0
f (m)− h(n) (C.7a)
s.t. mi +∑
j∈I
nij ≤ ai [ri] ∀i ∈ I , (C.7b)
Nj ≥ φmj [wj] ∀j ∈ I , (C.7c)
∑
i∈I
nij = Nj [vj] ∀i ∈ I . (C.7d)
The next problem characterizes households’ equilibrium behavior in the lower stage.
min
n≥0 ∑i∈I
h(m), s.t. (C.7b) and (C.7d). (C.8a)
max
(v,w)≥0
−∑
i∈I
Njvj −∑
i∈I
ri(ai −mi), s.t. vj ≥ −ri − tij ∀i, j ∈ I (C.8b)
where vj can be interpreted as households’ maximum possible payoﬀ from working in j ∈ I .
Denote a solution for (C.8b) by {wi(m,N), vj(m,N)}.
The set of all feasible assignments of ﬁrms and households (m,N) is
X2 ≡
{
(m,N) ∈ RI+ ×RI+
∣∣∣∣∣ Nj ≥ φmj ∀j ∈ I , M+ ∑j∈N Nj ≤ 1, m ∈ M
}
, (C.9)
which is a closed and convex set. Let h2(m,N) be the optimal value function of the problems
(C.2) and (C.8b). Then, it follows that
∂h2(m,N)
∂mi
= ri(m,N) and
∂h2(m,N)
∂Nj
= −vj(m,N) (C.10)
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if h is diﬀerentiable. Let g2 be deﬁned by g2(m,N) ≡ f (m)− h2(m,N). Then, we have
∂g2(m,N)
∂mi
= Ai(m)− ri(m,N) and ∂g2(m,N)
∂Nj
= vj(m,N) (C.11)
almost everywhere. Also, (C.7) is equivalent to the problem max(m,n)∈X2 g2(m,N). If we
interpret Ai(m)− ri(m,N) and vj(m,N) as the payoﬀ of ﬁrms and households, respectively,
the upper stage game may be interpreted as a non-atomic potential game.
D The two-cell city in detail
This Appendix studies the two-cell case by straightforwardly investigating the equilibrium
conditions without Assumption 3. LetM0 ⊂M be deﬁned by
M0 ≡ {m ∈ M | (1+ φ)mi ≤ ai ∀i ∈ I} . (D.1)
Upon inspection, the solution for the lower-stage equilibrium (Deﬁnition 2) is given by:{
nii = φmi, nij = 0, rˇi = wi = 0,
njj = φmj, nji = 0, rˇj = wj = 0,
ifm ∈ M0, (D.2a){
nii = φmi, nij = 0, rˇi = wi = t,
njj = φmj, nji = (1+ φ)mi − ai, rˇj = wj = 0,
if (1+ φ)mi − ai > 0, i ∈ I , (D.2b)
where we employ the convention that i ̸= j.
Ifm ∈ M0, or (1+ φ)mi − ai ≤ 0 for both cells 1 and 2, all households can reside at their
workplace and there are no inter-cell commutes. In this case, we let rˇi = wi = 0 for both
i ∈ I . On the other hand, if m /∈ M0, then (1+ φ)mi − ai > 0 for one of the cells, meaning
that there is a shortage of labor in cell i. There must be (1+ φ)mi − ai workers who commute
to cell i from the other cell. In this case, wi = t is the minimal possible wage rate in cell i
to compensate for the commuting cost. The highest bid for the land rents in each cell i must
coincide with the wage rates therein. Thus, we have rˇi = wi = t.
Take m1 = mˆ as a candidate of equilibrium in the upper-stage game. For simplicity, sup-
pose M > a1 and a1 > a2 so that mˆ = a1. Since (1+ φ)mˆ − a1 = φa1 > 0, there must be
commuters from cell 2 to cell 1. Thus, c1 = (1+ φ)t and c2 = 0, which gives
pˇi1 = A1 − c1 = mˆ+ δ(M− mˆ)− (1+ φ)t, (D.3a)
pˇi2 = A2 − c2 = (M− mˆ) + δmˆ (D.3b)
where δ = e−τ. Since 0 < m2 < a2, we have rˆ2 = 0 from (4.5). For rˆ1, it must be that
rˆ1 = pˇi1 − pˇi2 = 2(1− δ)(mˆ− m¯)− (1+ φ)t (D.4)
to satisfy equilibrium condition (4.4). The ﬁrst term in rˆ1 is A1− A2, which is positive. Because
of the asymmetry a1 > a2, ﬁrms in cell 1 enjoy higher level of technological externalities than
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mˇ m˜−
m¯
m˜+ mˆ
0
f
g
hˇ
(a) t = 0.3
mˇ m˜−
m¯
m˜+ mˆ
(b) t = 0.1
mˇ m˜−
m¯
m˜+ mˆ
(c) t = 0.03
mˇ m˜−
m¯
m˜+ mˆ
(d) t = 0.01
Figure D.4: Graphs of g(m1) for high, medium, and low values of t with excess land supply.
M = 0.4, a1 = 0.55, δ = 0.1, φ = 1. •: local maximizers; ◦: locally minimizing KKT points.
those in cell 2 at m1 = mˆ. The second term in rˆ1 is the minimized cost that ﬁrms have to bear.
If rˆ1 ≥ 0, then rˆ1 satisﬁes (4.5), and m1 = mˆ is an equilibrium for the upper-stage game.
Note that the condition rˆ1 ≥ 0 indicates either that δ is small (τ is large) or that t is small. If
t is large, then ﬁrms cannot support the devoted business cell 1. After paying the commuting
costs and land rents, ﬁrms’ proﬁts in cell 1 become lower than those in cell 2. Similarly, if
δ is large, the diﬀerence between the production levels A1 and A2 becomes smaller, thereby
reducing the beneﬁt of agglomeration to cell 1.
We may continue the above procedure to enumerate all equilibria. With the aid of the
potential function, the main text instead employs a more systematic approach.
The solution (D.2) gives the minimized total commuting costs hˇ(m) in the city:34
hˇ(m) = max {t ((1+ φ)m2 − a2) , 0, t ((1+ φ)m1 − a1)} (D.5)
=

t ((1+ φ)(M−m1)− a2) if m1 ≤ m˜−,
0 if m˜− ≤ m1 ≤ m˜+,
t ((1+ φ)m1 − a1) if m1 ≥ m˜+.
(D.6)
where m˜− = M− a21+φ and m˜+ = a11+φ . We conﬁrm that hˇ(m) can be expressed as a piecewise
maximum of aﬃne functions and that ∇h(m) = c(m) almost everywhere.
The interval [m˜−, m˜+] corresponds to M0. Observe that Assumption 3 implies m˜− = m˜+
and the plateau (m˜−, m˜+) of hˇ(m1) vanishes. Figure D.4 shows graphs of g(m1) without As-
sumption 3. As the ﬁgure illustrates, there is no essential diﬀerence in the properties of local
maximizers with additional complications. Agglomeration of ﬁrms in either of the cells be-
come local maximizers when t is low. Also note that m1 = m¯ is always a local minimizer. This
generalizes to the circular case treated in Section 6 (see Proposition D.1 below).
Remark D.1. Suppose m1 ̸= m˜−, m˜+. Then, we have hˇ′(m1) = c1(m)− c2(m) and f ′(m1) =
2(1− δ)(m1− m¯) = A1(m)− A2(m), so that g′(m1) = pˇi1(m)− pˇi2(m). For example, observe
that mˆ ∈ L if and only if g′(mˆ) = pˇi1 − pˇi2 = rˆ1 > 0. Thus, mˆ is a local maximizer whenever it
is an equilibrium, except for the borderline case rˆ1 = 0. ♦
34Observe that the function hˇ(m) can be interpreted interchangeably as the total commuting cost∑i∈I ∑j∈I tijnij
or as total household surplus φ∑i∈I wimi −∑i∈I rˇi(ai −mi) with the solution (D.2). This demonstrates the strong
duality between (S) and (D).
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0 t˜ t∗ tˇ = tˆ
mˆ
m˜
mˇ
(a) M = 0.4
0 tˇ t˜ t∗ tˆ
mˆ
m˜
mˇ
(b) M = 0.7
Figure D.5: Eﬀects of varying M. a1 = 0.6. When M < a1, it is more likely that m1 = mˇ
become a local maximizer because cell 1 cannot contain all ﬁrms. When M > a1, the converse
holds true, and m1 = mˇ is less likely to be a local maximizer. If a1 = a2 = 12 , the diagram
become isomorphic to Figure 2a, and there are no qualitative diﬀerences when M varies.
Remark D.2. The mass of ﬁrms M acts as a scaling factor for both t and a1. For t, observe that
|hˇ′(m1)| = (1+ φ)t = tM whenever hˇ is diﬀerentiable under Assumption 3. For a1, we note
that when M < a1, it is more likely that a concentration to cell 2 becomes a local maximizer,
because cell 2 can contain the majority of ﬁrms (Figure D.5a); when M > a1, the converse
holds true (Figure D.5b). In Section 6, for simplicity we assume M = 11+φ =
1
2 so that M = a1
holds true under the symmetry of cells (a1 = a2 = 12 ). ♦
In addition, we note that the uniform distribution m¯ = (m¯, m¯, . . . , m¯) can never locally
maximize the potential function without Assumption 3 in the circular case in Section 6.
Proposition D.1. Suppose Assumption 2. Suppose that ℓij = 1I min{|i − j|, I − |i − j|} and that
m¯ ∈ M0. Then, m¯ is a locally minimizing KKT point of (P) if and only if (1+ φ)M < 1.
Proof. Since m¯ ∈ M0, ai − (1+ φ)m¯ ≤ 0 for all i ∈ I . Let
O ≡
{
ϵ ∈ TM
∣∣∣∣ maxi∈I {ϵi} ≤ ai − (1+ φ)m¯
}
. (D.7)
Note that O = {0} iﬀ (1+ φ)M = 1, i.e., O admits nonzero elements iﬀ (1+ φ)M < 1.
Under Assumption 2, we have
f (m) =
1
2 ∑i∈I ∑j∈I
dij(mi − m¯)(mj − m¯) + 12 m¯
2∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
dij = f (m− m¯) + f (m¯). (D.8)
For all nonzero ϵ ∈ O, we have g(m) = f (m), since by deﬁnition m¯+ ϵ ∈ M0 and h(m¯+ ϵ) =
0. For ϵ ∈ O deﬁne g¯(ϵ) ≡ g(m¯+ ϵ) = f (ϵ) + f (m¯) be the potential function deﬁned onO. It
follows∇g¯(0) = 0 and∇2 g¯(0) = D. Note D is positive deﬁnite on TM and thus on O. Thus,
ϵ = 0 is a local minimizer of g¯, whence m¯ is a locally minimizing KKT point of (P).
E Computation of potential value when I is large
For J ≤ K, let f J = f (mJ) and hJ ≡ hˇ(mJ), so that g(mJ) = gJ ≡ f J − hJ . Let f∞ ≡ f (m¯),
h∞ ≡ hˇ(m¯) = 0, and g∞ ≡ f∞ − h∞ = f∞. Figure 9 is obtained by numerically comparing the
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potential values {g∞} ∪ {gJ}KJ=1, where K = 50, so that I = 4LCM(20) = 931, 170, 240.
Let R ≡ I4J be the “radius” of a business center inmJ ; R is an integer for all J ≤ K because
I = 4LCM(K). For the ﬁrst block element mˇJ inmJ , the set of cell indices for the residential
cells (mi = 0) is I−J ∪ I+J with I−J ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,R} and I+J ≡ {3R + 1, . . . , 4R}, whereas the
business area (mi = a) is IJ ≡ {R+ 1,R+ 2, . . . , 3R}.
In the lower stage, households in cell i ∈ I−J should commute to cell i+ R ∈ IJ , whereas
those in cell i ∈ I+J should commute to cell i − R ∈ IJ , thereby the commuting cost for
every household is tRI . The mass of such households is (|I+J |+ |I−J |)a = 2Ra, and there are J
symmetric small cities. The total commuting cost hJ is
hJ = J × 2Ra× tRI =
t
8J
. (E.1)
Observe that hJ is decreasing in J and it is independent of I.
Noting that I is extremely large, we employ continuous versions of f by taking limit I → ∞
to simplify numerical computations. The continuous version of f is given as follows:
1
2
∫∫
C×C
exp (−τℓ(x, y))m(x)m(y)dxdy (E.2)
where C = [0, 1) parameterizes the circle; ℓ(x, y) = min{|x − y|, 1 − |x − y|} (x, y ∈ C) is
a continuous version of {ℓij}, and m(x) is the density interpretation of the spatial pattern.
For example, m¯ corresponds to m(x) = 12 for all x ∈ C, m1 may correspond to m(x) = 1
for x ∈ [ 14 , 34 ] and 0 otherwise, m2 may correspond to m(x) = 1 for x ∈ [ 18 , 38 ] ∪ [ 58 , 78 ] and 0
otherwise, and so on. In concrete terms, we let the density interpretation ofmJ be
mJ(x) =
1 if x ∈
⋃J
j=1 B Jj
0 otherwise,
(E.3)
where B Jj ≡ [ j2J − 14J , j2J + 14J ] is the jth business center inmJ . For f (m¯), letting δ = e−
τ
I gives
f (m¯) =
m¯2
2
1⊤D1 =
1
8I
1+ δ
1− δ
(
1− δ I2
)
=
1
8I
1+ e− τI
1− e− τI
(
1− e− τ2
)
−→ 1
4τ
(
1− e− τ2
)
(E.4)
as I → ∞. The last expression naturally coincides with a computation based on (E.2):
1
2
(
1
2
)2 ∫ 1
2
− 12
e−τ|y|dy =
1
4τ
(
1− e− τ2
)
. (E.5)
FormJ , a computation based on (E.2) yields
f J = (1+ΨJ) f∞ where ΨJ ≡
(
1+
2C(δJ)
log(δJ)
)
Ψ¯J (E.6)
with C(z) ≡ 1−z1+z ; δJ ≡ e−
τ
2J ; Ψ¯J ≡ 1 for an even J and Ψ¯J ≡ C(e− τ2 )−1 for an odd J. The
expression can also be obtained by ﬁrst computing an explicitly discrete potential value for
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(a) ΨJ = ( f J − f∞)/ f∞ (b) f J (log vertical axis)
Figure E.6: Graphs of ΨJ and f J for J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}.
(a) ∆gJ in the t-axis (τ = 25) (b) ∆gJ in the τ-axis (t = 0.08)
Figure E.7: Relative potential values ∆gJ ≡ gJ − g and potential maximizing patterns.
mJ and then taking the limit I → ∞. We have ΨJ ∈ (0, 1) (Figure E.6a). Additional calculation
shows that ΨJ is decreasing in J, implying that f J is basically decreasing in J.35 The beneﬁt of
agglomeration decreases with the number of business centers decreases (see Figure E.6b).
As an example of global potential maximization inM∗, Figure E.7 depicts the diﬀerences
∆gJ ≡ gJ − g∞ for 1 ≤ J ≤ 7. When ∆gJ < 0 for all J, the uniform distribution m¯ globally
maximizes g amongM∗. If J∗ = argmax1≤J≤K ∆gJ and ∆gJ∗ > 0, then J∗ globally maximizes g
inM∗. Thus, the patterns that correspond to the upper envelope of {0,∆g1,∆g2, . . . ,∆gK} also
correspond to the global maximizers of the potential function inM∗. Figure E.7a and Figure
E.7b show {∆gJ}7J=1 on to the vertical and horizontal broken lines in Figure 9b, respectively.
Observe that the sequence of potential maximizing symmetric patterns while decreasing t is
given by m¯ → m4 → m3 → m2 → m1 for the former (i.e., J∗ = 4), whereas the sequence for
an increasing τ is given by m¯→m1 →m2 →m3 → · · · for the latter.
It is also noted that gJ ≥ g∞ implies that mJ is an equilibrium when I grows large. The
35In concrete terms, { f J} can be shown to satisfy the following properties: f J is monotonically decreasing in τ
for all J, f J > f∞ for all J, f J > f J+2 for all J, f1 > f2, limJ→∞ f J = f∞, and limτ→0 f J = limτ→0 f∞ = 18 .
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market prices in the lower stage over I−J ∪ IJ ∪ I+J is then given by rˇi = wi = tI (i − 1) and
rˇ4R+(i−1) = rˇi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2R}. FormJ to be an equilibrium, it must be that
rˆi = Ai(mJ)− φwi − rˇi − pi∗ = Ai(mJ)− 2rˇi − pi∗ ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ IJ (E.7)
where pi∗ is the equilibrium proﬁt level. We ﬁrst note that A(m) is symmetric and concave on
IJ . From symmetry of the spatial pattern, Ak(mJ) = A3R−k(mJ). With Ak ≡ Ak(mJ), we have
A′′k ≡
(Ak+1 − Ak)− (Ak − Ak−1)
2
=
Ak+1 − 2Ak + Ak−1
2
< 0 ∀k ∈ IJ \ {R+ 1, 3R}, (E.8)
thereby {Ak} is mid-point concave on IJ . In fact, for all k ∈ IJ \ {R+ 1, 3R} we compute
A′′k =
(
δ+ δ−1
2
− 1
) I
2−1
∑
l=1
dk,k+l(mk−l +mk+l)− (1− δ)
(
mk − δ−1d1, I2mk+ I2
)
< 0 (E.9)
wheremk ∈ {0, a} (mod I for indices); and δ = e− τI , where the inequality follows by noting that
δ+δ−1
2 − 1 = cosh( τI )− 1 < 0; mk − δ−1d1, I2mk+ I2 > mk − mk+ I2 ≥ a− a = 0. In addition, one
shows that 12 (AI + A1) =
1
2 (A4R + A4R+1) = A¯ as well as that A1 > A¯ and A4R > A¯, where A¯
is the uniform level of A(m) at m¯. Then, the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrms may be evaluated by
the average proﬁt of ﬁrms in cell 1 and I as pi∗ = 12 (pˇi1 + pˇiI) = A¯− 2tI
(
R− 12
)
= A¯− t2J + tI .
Because {Ai} is symmetric and mid-point concave on IJ , (E.7) is satisﬁed when
rˆ2R = rˆ2R+1 = A2R − t2J − A¯−
t
I
≥ 0. (E.10)
On the other hand, gJ − g∞ is computed as
f J − hJ − f∞ = J2 ∑k∈IJ
aAk − J × 2R× t4J −
1
2
Im¯A¯ =
J
2I ∑k∈IJ
(
Ak − t2J − A¯
)
. (E.11)
If gJ − g∞ ≥ 0, then it must be that A2R − t2J − A¯ > 0 because Ak is (mid-point) concave and
symmetric over IJ . If instead A2R− t2J − A¯ ≤ 0, then Ak− t2J − A¯ < 0 for all k ∈ IJ \ {2R, 2R+
1}, implying gJ − g∞ < 0. We thus observe that gJ ≥ g∞ is a suﬃcient condition for (E.10)
when I is extremely large so that the last term tI in (E.10) is negligible.
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